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1 Introduction
Under what conditions will sequential bilateral exchange be Pareto eﬃcient? Enforceable contracts
(Coase 1960) or repeated interaction (Fudenberg & Maskin 1986) can lead to eﬃcient exchange
under some conditions. This paper addresses a third possible source of eﬃciency: a direct concern
for the welfare of the other party, often called social preferences.
I analyze theoretically a simple, two-stage bilateral exchange game initially defined in terms of
“material payoﬀs”–the standard payoﬀs from one’s own consumption. Each of the two players in
turn chooses how much of an action to take. The action increases the other player’s material payoﬀ
but at the cost of reducing one’s own material payoﬀ. I assume that gains from trade are possible:
both players could get a higher material payoﬀ than their respective outside options if both took
a positive amount of their action. However, I further assume that contracting is infeasible and the
exchange is one-shot. Hence, if both players were purely self-regarding–caring only about their
own material payoﬀ–then no gains from trade would be realized because neither player would have
any reason to choose a positive amount of his action.
Instead of being purely self-regarding, each player has social preferences that depend on both his
own and the other player’s material payoﬀ, and thus players might be willing to choose a positive
action. Moreover, the second-mover’s (SM’s) optimal action may depend on the first-mover’s (FM’s)
action. If so, then even if FM is purely self-regarding, it may turn out to be optimal for FM to take
an action that, together with SM’s optimal response, generates a Pareto improvement relative to no
trade. In fact, it is possible that at the equilibrium of the game, the outcome is Pareto eﬃcient–all
potential gains from trade are realized. I identify necessary conditions and suﬃcient conditions on
the players’ preferences for the outcome of their interaction to be Pareto eﬃcient.
While much of the literature on social preferences assumes a particular model of distributional
concerns, most commonly “inequity aversion” (e.g., Fehr, Klein, & Schmidt 2007), I study how
results depend on general properties of social preferences that are shared by many specific models.
In particular, three general properties of social preferences play a prominent role in the analysis.
The first property a player’s social preferences might have is “joint-monotonicity”: given any ini-
tial transaction, there exists an alternative transaction that gives higher material payoﬀ to both
players that is preferred. This property is a weakening of the monotonicity property assumed by
altruistic preferences, which says that given any initial transaction, any alternative transaction
that gives higher material payoﬀ to both players is preferred. Unlike with monotonic (altruistic)
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preferences, an agent with joint-monotonic preferences may dislike it if only one player’s material
payoﬀ increases. As such, joint-monotonicity accommodates the possibility of fairness concerns.
The second property is “normality”: both players’ material payoﬀs enter the utility function as
“normal goods.” That is, holding constant the rate of tradeoﬀ between the players’ material pay-
oﬀs, if the pie gets larger, the actor prefers that both material payoﬀs increase. The third property
is that the utility function is “fairness-kinked.” Such social preferences capture behavior that in-
volves following a “fairness rule,” which specifies one player’s material payoﬀ as a strictly increasing
function of the other player’s material payoﬀ; an example is the “50-50 split rule,” which specifies
that one player gets the same material payoﬀ as the other player. An actor with fairness-kinked
social preferences prefers an outcome that exactly implements the fairness rule over a range of rates
of tradeoﬀ between the players’ material payoﬀs. Joint-monotonicity and normality are satisfied
by virtually all existing models of altruism and fairness, while fairness-kinkedness is satisfied by
several leading fairness models (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Charness & Rabin 2002).
The central results of the paper describe two main cases in which social preferences generate
eﬃciency in bilateral exchange. The first case occurs when material payoﬀs are “conditionally
transferable”: the marginal impact of SM’s action on both FM’s material payoﬀ and SM’s material
payoﬀ is not aﬀected by FM’s action. A leading example is when both players’ material payoﬀs are
linear in SM’s action, which is a standard assumption for situations where SM’s action is a monetary
payment to FM. When the material payoﬀs are conditionally transferable, two further conditions
are suﬃcient to guarantee eﬃciency: SM’s social preferences satisfy normality, and FM’s preferences
satisfy monotonicity (and not just joint-monotonicity). Intuitively, whenever the material payoﬀs
are conditionally transferable, FM’s action determines the total amount of material surplus to be
divided, and SM’s action determines the distribution of that surplus. If SM’s social preferences are
normal, then whenever FM’s action makes the pie larger, SM’s best-response action will lead to a
distribution of the surplus that gives greater material payoﬀ to both players on net. Given SM’s
best-response function, as long as FM is purely self-regarding or altruistic, FM will prefer to take
the level of her action that maximizes the total amount of material surplus.
Even if the material payoﬀs are not conditionally transferable, there is a second case in which
social preferences generate eﬃciency: SM’s social preferences are kinked. This case arises when
SM’s social preferences are suﬃciently fairness-kinked that he behaves in accordance with a fairness
rule. If, in addition, FM’s preferences satisfy monotonicity (and not just joint-monotonicity), then
the equilibrium is eﬃcient. Intuitively, whenever SM behaves in accordance with a fairness rule,
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FM maximizes both his own material payoﬀ and SM’s material payoﬀ by choosing the action that
induces the highest achievable point on this fairness rule. Like in the first case, if FM is purely
self-regarding or altruistic, FM will choose the action that generates an eﬃcient outcome.
In either of the two cases sketched above, joint-monotonicity is suﬃcient for SM’s social pref-
erences for not for FM’s. Even though SM’s behavior causes the players’ material incentives to
become aligned, if FM is willing to accept a lower material payoﬀ for herself in order to come out
ahead of SM, the equilibrium may not be eﬃcient.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the bilateral exchange
game. Section 3 introduces the properties of social preferences. Preparatory results are contained
in Section 4. Section 5 presents necessary conditions for the equilibrium to be eﬃcient. Section
6 presents suﬃcient conditions. Section 7 relates the results to existing literature in behavioral
economics and the economics of the family and applies the results to the rotten kid game and to
gift exchange. Section 8 speculates about possible extensions, such as incorporating social signaling
or intentions-based reciprocity into the social preferences. All proofs are in an Online Appendix.
2 The Bilateral Exchange Game
In this section, I introduce the bilateral exchange environment that I will analyze in the rest of the
paper. The first mover (FM) chooses the level of a costly action 1 that helps the second mover
(SM). SM then chooses the level of a costly action 2 that helps FM. In the classic gift exchange
example, an employer pays a wage to a worker, and then the worker exerts some amount of eﬀort.
Define a transaction to be any pair of real numbers (1 2). (I allow any real values to avoid
dealing with boundary conditions.) Rather than taking an action, either player can choose during
her or his turn not to trade, in which case both players receive an outside option payoﬀ, the same
as if the action pair had been (0 0).1
I assume that FM’s and SM’s respective preferences can be represented by utility functions
1 (1 (1 2)  2 (1 2)) and 2 (1 (1 2)  2 (1 2)). That is, each player’s utility is a function
of the same subutility functions, 1 and 2, calledmaterial payoﬀ functions. The interpretation
1An alternative assumption would be that if FM takes her outside option, the payoﬀs are as if the action pair were
(0 0), but if SM takes his outside option after FM has already chosen 1, the payoﬀs are as if the action pair were
(1 0). The assumption in the text is weakly better for SM because SM could always get the payoﬀ from (1 0) after
FM has chosen 1 by taking action 2 = 0. Therefore, if SM chooses to trade with the assumption in the text, then
SM would also choose to trade with this alternative assumption. The text is simpler to represent diagrammatically,
and since the analysis primarily focuses on situations where trade occurs, the choice of outside option assumption
makes little diﬀerence.
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is that these “material payoﬀs” represent the purely self-regarding component of payoﬀs, and each
player’s preferences may depend on the other player’s material payoﬀ in addition to his/her own.2
This formulation of preferences is common in applied theory because it allows the analyst to make
assumptions separately on the material payoﬀ functions, which define the game under study–
the mapping between actions and self-regarding outcomes–and on the 1 (1 2) and 2 (1 2),
which capture social preferences over how the material payoﬀs are allocated. For brevity, I will
sometimes use the vector notation, −→ (1 2) ≡ (1 (1 2)  2 (1 2)).
I formalize the bilateral exchange game by making the following assumptions:
A1. 1 (1 2) and 2 (1 2) are twice continuously-diﬀerentiable.
A2. Each player’s action increases the other player’s material payoﬀ while reducing his or her
own: 11  0, 21  0, 12  0, and 22  0.
A3. FM’s material payoﬀ function is weakly concave in the “goods” (−1 2), and SM’s material
payoﬀ function is weakly concave in the “goods” (1−2), with at least one player’s material payoﬀ
function strictly concave in at least one of the arguments. This assumption helps ensure uniqueness
of equilibrium.
A4. The outside option material payoﬀs and utilities are normalized to zero: 1 (0 0) = 2 (0 0) =
1 (0 0) = 2 (0 0) = 0. As a tie-breaker, I assume each player chooses to trade unless his or her
outside option gives strictly higher utility.
A5. There are (material) gains from trade: −1(00)11(00)2  2(00)1−2(00)2 . If this condition is
satisfied, then for any suﬃciently small, positive actions 1  0 and 2  0 such that FM’s
material payoﬀ equals 0, i.e., 1(00)1 1+ 1(00)2 2 = 0, SM’s material payoﬀ is strictly positive:
2(00)
1 1 + 2(00)2 2  0.
A6. Since the action spaces are unbounded, the following technical condition helps ensure existence
of optimal actions: For any b1 and b2, each of the mappings from one agent’s action to a real
number defined by 1 (b1 2), 2 (b1 2), 1 (1b2), and 2 (1b2) is surjective.
I postpone until the next section discussion of properties of the social preferences.
2Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, & Sobel (2008) refer to this traditional approach as a model of
“well-being externalities” and have a careful discussion of alternative approaches.
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Two prominent examples of bilateral exchange games are the gift exchange game and the rotten
kid game:
Example 1. Gift exchange game (Akerlof 1982; Akerlof & Yellen 1990; Fehr, Kirch-
steiger, & Riedl 1993). FM is an employer who pays salary 1 to a worker. Then SM,
the worker, exerts eﬀort level 2. The material payoﬀ functions are 1 (1 2) = 2 − 1 and
2 (1 2) =  (1) −  (2), where  is the worker’s concave benefit from money satisfying 0  0
and 00 ≤ 0; and  is his convex cost of eﬀort satisfying 0  0 and 00 ≥ 0. In addition, ei-
ther 00  0, lim→−∞ 0 () = 0, and lim→∞ 0 () = ∞; or 00  0, lim→−∞ 0 () = ∞, and
lim→∞ 0 () = 0.3
Example 2. Rotten kid game (Becker 1974). FM is a child who chooses how much eﬀort 1
to exert to earn money for the family. Then SM, the parent, transfers some amount, 2, of family
income to the child. The child’s private income is 1 + 2 −  (1), where 1 ≥ 0 is exogenous
income, and  (1) is his convex cost of eﬀort function (in dollars) satisfying 0  0, 00  0,
lim→−∞ 0 () = 0, and lim→∞ 0 () = ∞. The parent’s private income is 2 + 1 − 2, where
2 ≥ 0 is an exogenous component of the parent’s income. The child’s consumption is 1 (1 2) =
1+2−(1)1 , where 1  0 is the market price of consumption faced by the child. The parent’s
consumption is 2 (1 2) = 2+1−22 , where 2  0 (possibly equal to 1) is the market price of
consumption faced by the parent.
While the rotten kid game is a bilateral exchange game in its essential features, the players are
usually assumed not to have an outside option. Other examples include the trust game (Berg,
Dickhaut, & McCabe 1995) and a sequential public goods game.
There are also a few properties that material payoﬀ functions could have that will be useful to
define for the analysis and discussion later. An important property is local conditional trans-
ferability at action pair (1 2): in a neighborhood of (1 2), 1(12)22(12)2 = − for some
constant   0. If the material payoﬀ functions are locally conditionally transferable at some
action pair, then conditional on FM’s action, SM’s action is locally a linear transfer of material
payoﬀ from SM to FM.
3Following Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl (1993), in order to rule out negative payoﬀ values, most laboratory gift-
exchange experiments use as material payoﬀ functions: 1 (1 2) = (1 − 1) 2 and 2 (1 2) = 1 −  (2)− 2,
where 1  0 and 2 are constants, and 1 ≤ 1 and 2 ≥ 0 have restricted domain. As long as the equilibrium is in
the interior of the domains of 1 and 2, all of the analysis in this paper will apply.
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Definition 1. The material payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transferable if there
exist functions , , and  and constant   0 such that
1 (1 2) = − (1) +  (1 2)
2 (1 2) =  (1)−  (1 2) 
A special case of global conditional transferability is conditional quasi-linearity, where  (1 2) =
 (1) 2 for some function . A special case of conditional quasi-linearity is quasi-linearity in
SM’s action, where  (1) = 1.
If the material payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transferable, then they satisfy conditional
transferability at (1 2) for all action pairs (1 2). Material payoﬀs that are quasi-linear in SM’s
action, 1 (1 2) = − (1)+2 and 2 (1 2) =  (1)−2, are often used to model situations
where SM’s action is a monetary payment. The material payoﬀ functions in Example 2 satisfy
quasi-linearity in SM’s action. The material payoﬀ functions in Example 1 satisfy quasi-linearity
in SM’s action if 00 = 0 but are not locally conditional transferability at any action pair if 00  0.
Another property that will come up later is (1 2)-additive-separability, the usual kind of
additive separability that is satisfed by the material payoﬀ functions in both Examples 1 and 2.
However, an alternative property that also plays a role is an unusual form of additive-separability.
Definition 2. The material payoﬀ functions are (1 1)-additively-separable if there exist
functions  , , and  such that
1 (1 2) =  (1 2)
2 (1 2) =  (1)−  ( (1 2)) 
where  0  0.
In this case, SM’s material payoﬀ function can be written as an additively-separable function of
FM’s action and FM’s material payoﬀ: 2 =  (1) −  (1). The material payoﬀs functions do
not satisfy this property in either Example 1 or Example 2. However, they could describe a setting
where FM’s action both increases SM’s material payoﬀ directly, and generates a valuable asset that
SM’s action allocates. For example, an investor (FM) might invest an amount of money 1 and
pay a trustee (SM) an amount  (1) to oversee the investment, and then the trustee allocates the
accumulated capital between the investor and himself by choice of 2. Material payoﬀ functions
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that are (1 1)-additively-separable are also globally conditionally transferable if  00 = 0, but are
not if  00 6= 0.
2.1 Equilibrium
The solution concept is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
In a typical optimal contracting problem, an employer (FM) can make the wage a function
of output, which is a noisy function of the worker’s eﬀort. The worker (SM) has an incentive to
exert eﬀort because the wage partly depends on eﬀort. In contrast, in the bilateral exchange game,
FM’s action is a number, not a function of any variable (like output) that depends on SM’s action.
Therefore SM has no extrinsic incentive to choose a high level of his action. Clearly, if SM were
purely selfish, with utility function 2 (1 2) = 2, then regardless of FM’s action, SM would take
minimal action (here actually, negative infinity, since the actions are unbounded). There would
be no exchange because FM would prefer her outside option. Hence, any exchange that occurs
in equilibrium is a consequence of SM’s social preferences. That is why this stark setting of no
contracting and no repetition makes the implications of social preferences as clear as possible.
2.2 Eﬃciency
Recall that a transaction is defined to be Pareto eﬃcient if there is no alternative transaction that
could have made one party better oﬀ without making the other worse oﬀ. Here, there are two
potentially relevant interpretations of Pareto eﬃciency, depending on whether the players’ welfare
is measured by material payoﬀs or by utilities.
Definition 3. A transaction (1 2) is utility Pareto eﬃcient (UPE) if there is no other trans-
action (b1b2) such that 1 (−→ (b1b2)) ≥ 1 (−→ (1 2)) and 2 (−→ (b1b2)) ≥ 2 (−→ (1 2)), at
least one inequality strict.
Definition 4. A transaction (1 2) is materially Pareto eﬃcient (MPE) if there is no
other transaction (b1b2) such that 1 (b1b2) ≥ 1 (1 2) and 2 (b1b2) ≥ 2 (1 2), at least
one inequality strict.
If a transaction (1 2) is MPE, then I will also refer to the resulting material payoﬀ pair −→ (1 2)
as MPE; analogously for UPE. A transaction (1 2) is MPE if and only if at that transaction,
the material-payoﬀ marginal rates of substitution are equal: 1(12)11(12)2 = 2(12)12(12)2 . If the
material payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transferable or (1 1)-additively-separable,
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then there is a unique materially-eﬃcient action for FM4 (the converse also holds locally; see the
discussion of Proposition 1 below, and see Dijkstra 2007). However, more generally, the level of 1
that corresponds to an MPE transaction may depend on 2.
If both players were purely self-regarding, then these two eﬃciency notions would coincide,
but in general, they do not. It is sometimes argued that individuals obey social norms that do
not maximize their material payoﬀs, even though the individuals’ material payoﬀs describe their
personal welfare (e.g., Sen 1973; Köszegi & Rabin 2008).5 To the extent that individuals’ social
preferences reflect adherence to social norms, a social planner might be interested in promoting
material Pareto eﬃciency rather than utility Pareto eﬃciency. On the other hand, if as usually as-
sumed utility represents both behavior and welfare, then utility Pareto eﬃciency is the appropriate
concept of social welfare.
This paper asks: What social preferences and material payoﬀ functions for the players lead to
a MPE equilibrium? A UPE equilibrium?
3 Social Preferences
3.1 Existing Models
Each player is assumed to maximize a continuous utility function defined over both players’ material
payoﬀs. The following three prominent fairness models and one prominent altruism model help
motivate the analysis that follows, which is general enough to accommodate all of them. For
concreteness, I state these models with respect to SM’s social preferences.
• Fehr & Schmidt’s (1999) “inequity-averse preferences” have the form
2 (1 2) = 2 − max {1 − 2 0}− max {2 − 1 0}  (1)
where  ≥ 0 is SM’s aversion to “disadvantageous unfairness” (FM earning more than SM),
and  ≥ 0 is his aversion to “advantageous unfairness” (SM earning more than FM).
4That is, the set of MPE transactions is {(1 2)}2∈R, for a constant 1. In principal-agent problems, it is
standard to assume conditional quasi-linearity because having a unique eﬃcient action for the agent simplifies the
analysis (Grossman & Hart 1983).
5For example, Sen (1973, pp.253-254) writes: “In economic analysis individual preferences seem to enter in two
diﬀerent roles: preferences come in as determinants of behaviour and they also come in as the basis of welfare
judgements...[However] mores and rules of behaviour [will] drive a wedge between behaviour and welfare. People’s
behaviour may still correspond to some consistent as if preference but a numerical representation of the as if pref-
erence cannot be interpreted as individual welfare. In particular, basing normative criteria, e.g., Pareto optimality,
on these as if preferences poses immense diﬃculties.”
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• Bolton & Ockenfels’s (2000) “Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition (ERC) preferences,” writ-
ten here in additively-separable form, are:
2 (1 2) = 2 − 
µ 2
2 + 1 −
1
2
¶2
 (2)
where  ≥ 0 weights a quadratic loss in deviation from an equal split. These preferences
are well defined as long as 1 2  0. When applying their model to a gift-exchange game,
Bolton & Ockenfels (2000, pp.183-187) instead use
2 (1 2) = − |1 − 2|  (3)
• Charness & Rabin (2002) propose “social welfare preferences,”
2 (1 2) = 2 + 1 + min {1 2}  (4)
where  ≥ 0 is SM’s positive regard for FM, and  ≥ 0 is his additional concern for whoever
gains least from the transaction.
• Becker’s (1974) model of altruism within the family assumes that 2 (1 2) is twice-continuously
diﬀerentiable, monotonically increasing in both arguments, quasi-concave, and normal (i.e.,
1 and 2 enter 2 as normal goods).
Applied economic analysis involving social preferences generally proceeds by studying the implica-
tions of one of the above models. Instead, I will study the behavioral implications of properties of
social preferences in order to understand what features of these functional forms drive results, and
which implications follow from which classes of models.
3.2 Properties of Social Preferences
Following convention, I describe the relevant monotonicity and concavity notions before getting to
the key properties of normality and fairness-kinkedness.
A primary diﬀerence between altruistic preferences and fairness preferences is that altruistic
preferences  (1 2) are assumed to be monotonically increasing in both arguments, like con-
sumption preferences over goods. In contrast, fairness preferences such as (1), (2), and (3) allow
for a type of non-monotonicity: an individual may prefer to reduce the payoﬀ of a person who is
ahead.
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Experimental economists disagree about the extent to which individuals are willing to reduce a
player’s material payoﬀ in order to ensure a more equal allocation. In hypothetical choices, Bazer-
man, Loewenstein, & White (1992) found that 25% of experimental participants preferred receiving
$500 for themselves and $500 for a friendly neighbor rather than receiving $600 for themselves and
$800 for the neighbor. When the choice was between $600 for each versus $600 for themselves and
$800 for the neighbor, 68% chose the fair but ineﬃcient outcome. In 3-player allocation problems
with real money at stake, Fehr, Naef, & Schmidt (2006) found similar patterns. However, other
researchers found that fewer participants make such materially Pareto ineﬃcient choices (Charness
& Rabin 2002; Engelmann & Strobel 2004). Relatedly, models of positional (or status) preferences
also predict a willingness to sacrifice one’s own material payoﬀ to reduce others’.
It is important to allow for this empirically relevant kind of non-monotonicity–where individ-
uals prefer to reduce a player’s material payoﬀ to reach a fairer allocation–in order to determine
whether and how it matters. At the same time, it is useful to rule out too much spitefulness or
self-hating, in which case an equilibrium might not exist. Joint-monotonicity is a new condition
that appropriately weakens monotonicity.6
Definition 5.  is joint-monotonic if for any (1 2) and any   0, there is some (b1 b2)
such that 0  b1 − 1  , 0  b2 − 2  , and  (b1 b2)   (1 2).
The definition states that for any material payoﬀ pair, there is an arbitrarily close alternative
material payoﬀ pair giving more to both players that the agent strictly prefers. It implies local
non-satiation but additionally requires that it is possible to find a more-preferred allocation in a
particular direction, a direction which jointly increases both players’ material payoﬀs. Hence joint-
monotonicity limits the extent to which an agent can be spiteful or self-hating, while permitting
the possibility that at some transactions, increasing only one player’s material payoﬀ might reduce
utility. Figures 1a and 1c show interpersonal indiﬀerence curves from social preferences satisfying
joint-monotonicity, while Figure 1b illustrates preferences that violate it. All of the above models
of social preferences satisfy joint-monotonicity.
The second condition, quasi-concavity, is familiar from consumer theory and social choice.
6 In studying other-regarding preferences in a general equilibrium environment, Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirch-
steiger, Riedel, & Sobel (2008) independently propose a “social monotonicity” property, which is similar to my
joint-monotonicity property, except that it is a restriction on both players’ distributional preferences. Formally, 1
and 2 satisfy “social monotonicity” if for any   0, there is some (1 2) with 0  1 − 1  , 0  2 − 2  ,
and  (1 2)   (1 2) for  = 1 2.
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Definition 6.  is quasi-concave if for any (1 2)  (b1 b2) such that  (1 2) ≤  (b1 b2),
 (1 2) ≤  (1 + (1− ) b1 2 + (1− ) b2) for any  ∈ [0 1].
For social preferences, quasi-concavity means that along an interpersonal indiﬀerence curve, the
higher FM’s material payoﬀ, the less of SM’s material payoﬀ the decision-maker is willing to give
up to increase the FM’s material payoﬀ (and vice-versa). Equivalently, it means that the upper
level sets of  are convex, which is a helpful regularity condition. All of the above models of social
preferences satisfy quasi-concavity.
A third potential assumption about  is that if the pie is larger, holding constant the rate of
tradeoﬀ in material payoﬀs, it is preferred that both players earn a higher material payoﬀ. Since
this thought experiment involves considering a linear tradeoﬀ in material payoﬀs, it corresponds to
the familiar assumption of “normal goods.”
Definition 7. Suppose e1 (; ) and e2 (; ), defined by
(e1 e2) = arg max{(12):1+2=} (1 2) 
are finite, real-valued functions. For  = 1 2,  is (weakly) locally normal in  at (; ) ife (; ) is (weakly) increasing in  at (; ).  is (weakly) normal in  if  is (weakly) locally
normal in  at (; ) for all  ∈ R and   0.  is (weakly) normal if  is (weakly) normal
in both 1 and 2.
(The functions e1 (; ) and e2 (; ) will in fact be well defined given other assumptions on  .)
Quah (2007, Theorem S1 and Proposition S1) shows that the statement about behavior “ is
locally normal in ” is essentially equivalent to the following statement about indiﬀerence curves:
for a small increase in , holding constant the other player’s material payoﬀ, the marginal rate of
substitution between the players’ material payoﬀs becomes less favorable toward player .7 Becker’s
(1974) altruism model explicitly assumes normality, and all of the above fairness functional forms–
(1), (2), (3), and (4)–also satisfy normality or weak normality.8 Nonetheless, existing work has not
recognized that normality is a strong and central assumption in generating fair-minded behavior
because it has been assumed implicitly as a byproduct of specific functional forms.
7To be more precise, these statements are equivalent when (12)1  0 and (12)2  0 (see discussion in Quah
2007, p.6). These partial derivatives may not be everywhere positive when  is joint-monotonic and not monotonic.
However, the analysis will show that normality is a relevant property for SM’s distributional preferences (not FM’s),
and Lemma 1 will establish that 2(12)1  0 and 2(12)2  0 hold at an optimum for SM.
8When actions are bounded, piecewise-linear functional forms like (1) and (4) satisfy only weak normality. How-
ever, requiring normality to be strict only matters for ensuring that the second-mover’s action is strictly increasing
in the first-mover’s action (Lemma 2) and that the equilibrium is unique (Theorems 3 and 4).
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A fourth property that will also turn out to be important is conformance to rules of fair behavior.
For example, the “50-50 split rule” has been documented in many laboratory experiments. The
simplest such experiment is a “dictator game,” where one player allocates a given amount of money
between himself and another player. Typically 20-30% of participants give exactly half of the money
to the other player (Camerer 2003). Conformance to a rule of fair behavior can be modeled with
kinked indiﬀerence curves.9 Indeed, a kink around equal material payoﬀs is the feature of fairness
models (1), (3), and (4) that allows them to explain the preponderance of equal splits. I will give
additional examples after formally defining and explaining this property of social preferences.
Definition 8.  is potentially fairness-kinked if it can be expressed as  = min© ª,
where   are twice-continuously diﬀerentiable utility functions satisfying:
• There exists some (1 2) at which  (1 2) =  (1 2).
• If  (1 2) ≤  (1 2), then  (b1 2)   (b1 2) for all b1  1.
• If  (1 2) ≥  (1 2), then  (1 b2)   (1 b2) for all b2  2.
Moreover,  is fairness-kinked at (1 2) if  is potentially fairness-rule adherent and a kink
occurs at (1 2): i.e.,  (1 2) =  (1 2) and (12)2(12)1  
(12)2
(12)1 .
(Note that if  and  are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave, then so is  .) Preferences that
are potentially fairness-kinked have indiﬀerence curves that are everywhere smooth (to ensure that
marginal analysis is applicable), except possibly at material payoﬀ pairs along the graph of the
“fairness rule.”
Definition 9. For a potentially fairness-kinked  , the fairness rule is the function  (2) that,
given a material payoﬀ for the second-mover 2, assigns the first-mover a material payoﬀ according
to  ( (2)  2) =  ( (2)  2).
Transactions that exactly satisfy the fairness rule are called fair transactions. Fairness-kinked
preferences can be interpreted as social preferences that penalize deviations from the fairness rule.
9Many of the same people who choose exactly even splits in a dictator game also choose to assign equal monetary
payoﬀs to themselves and another player in modified dictator games, where the “price” of increasing one player’s
payoﬀ by $1 is less than $1 (e.g., Andreoni & Miller 2002). No smooth utility function can explain equal-split behavior
in both cases. See Andreoni & Bernheim (2009) for an alternative model of 50-50 split behavior based on signaling.
As I discuss in more detail in Section 8, I conjecture that as long as the players’ behavior can be represented as if it
were generated by distributional social preferences, then the predictions about behavior will be essentially the same.
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To see this, note that  = min© ª can be equivalently expressed as  = +2 − ¯¯¯−2 ¯¯¯.
The first term can be thought of as a “standard” smooth utility function, while the second term
represents disutility from not adhering to the fairness rule.
The single-crossing properties in the definition of “potentially fairness-kinked” have two useful
implications. First, for SM,  =  in the region of disadvantageously unfair transactions,
where FM’s material payoﬀ is higher and SM’s material payoﬀ is lower than dictated by the fairness
rule; and  =  in the region of advantageously unfair transactions for SM. (Analogously, for
FM,  represents preferences at advantageously unfair transactions, and  represents preferences
at disadvantageously unfair transactions.) Second and more substantively, the fairness rule  is a
strictly increasing function: when the pie increases, the fairness rule assigns a larger piece of pie
to both players. Hence, fairness-kinked preferences are locally normal when the agent’s optimum
occurs at a fair transaction.10 Figure 1c shows social preferences that are fairness-kinked.
If indiﬀerence curves are kinked, then the agent’s optimum will occur at a kink point for a
range of budget constraints. The standard consumer theory example of “perfect complements”
is an extreme case where one segment of each indiﬀerence curve is vertical, the other segment
is horizontal, and the kinks occur along the identity line. Because the indiﬀerence segments are
vertical and horizontal, the optimum occurs at the kink for any downward-sloping, weakly concave
budget curve passing through the kink point, regardless of its slope. Because the kink points occur
along the identity line, the agent always prefers 1 unit of the first good for each unit of the second
good. Fairness-kinked preferences generalize perfect complements. The indiﬀerence curve segments
can be downward-sloping instead of vertical or horizontal, meaning that the optimum occurs at
the kink point for a range of slopes, but if one of the goods is suﬃciently inexpensive relative to
the other, then the agent’s optimum will occur away from the kink. Also with fairness-kinked
preferences, the path of kink points–the fairness rule–can be any upward-sloping curve, not just
the identity line.
Fairness-kinked preferences provide a simple model of behavior of an agent who follows a salient
norm of fair behavior, as long as doing so is not too costly for one of the players. For example:
• Splitting of money payoﬀs. Besides laboratory experiments, the equal-split fairness rule has
also been documented in a variety of field contexts, such as negotiations, asymmetric joint
10To be precise, suppose  is fairness-kinked, and the material payoﬀ pair (1 2) that maximizes  on budget
line 1 + 2 =  occurs at a kink point:  =  , 2 − 

1  0, and 

2 − 

1  0 evaluated at (1 2).
Then  is locally normal at (; ).
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ventures among corporations, share tenancy in agriculture, and bequests to children (Andreoni
& Bernheim 2009). However, financial contracts often apportion profit according to unequal
percentages that are standard in the industry. Suppose 1 and 2 are the actions of the two
parties, 1 (1 2) and 2 (1 2) are the resulting monetary profits, and the norm is that
1 = 2, with   0 possibly equal to 1. Suppose material payoﬀ functions are strictly
increasing functions of the amount of money earned, 1 = 1 (1) and 2 = 2 (2). Fairness-
kinked preferences with the fairness rule 1 = 1 ¡−12 (2)¢ would represent behavior that
splits money according to this rule.
• Posted prices. If a farmer leaves apples by the side of the road with a sign saying “$1 per
apple,” then a motorist passing by may feel obliged to leave $1 for each apple he takes (Dawes
& Thaler 1988). Let  denote the number of apples taken by the motorist, let  denote the
dollar amount of money he leaves, let 1 () denote the farmer’s material payoﬀ, and let
2 () denote the motorist’s material payoﬀ, where 1  0 1  0 2  0 and 2  0.
The fairness rule is an implicit function characterized by {−→ ()}=.
It is possible that FM and SM each have fairness-kinked preferences but with diﬀerent fairness
rules. This might occur if one or both parties has a self-serving perception of what is fair (as in
Babcock & Loewenstein 1997).
Finally, I note two technical assumptions (TAs) that I will assume hold throughout the analysis.
The first assumption is made necessary by the weakening of monotonicity. What matters for
behavior is whether the decision-maker’s indiﬀerence curves are kinked or smooth. When  is
monotonic, the interpersonal indiﬀerence curves are kinked if and only if  is kinked. However,
when  is joint-monotonic, there may be saddle points, (1 2) with 1 = 2 = 0, where the
indiﬀerence curves can be kinked even though  is smooth.11 TA1 ensures that the indiﬀerence
curves are kinked if and only if  is kinked.
TA1. At any point where  is diﬀerentiable,  has non-vanishing first derivative: There is no
(1 2) such that 1 = 2 = 0 at (1 2).
11For example, the function
 ( ) =



3 + 3 if   0   0
3 if   0  ≤ 0
3 if  ≤ 0   0
3 + 3 if  ≤ 0  ≤ 0
is continuously twice-diﬀerentiable, but has a kinked indiﬀerence curve at  ( ) = 0 given by min { } = 0.
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Second, I assume that at some suﬃciently low material payoﬀ for SM and high payoﬀ for FM, the
interpersonal indiﬀerence curves become vertical or upward-sloping, so that the player puts weakly
negative weight on FM’s material payoﬀ. Analogously, at some suﬃciently low material payoﬀ for
FM and high payoﬀ for SM, the interpersonal indiﬀerence curves become horizontal or upward-
sloping. This assumption ensure the existence of optimal actions for the players by helping to make
the set of individually-rational transactions compact, but does not otherwise play a substantive
role. Of course, this assumption would be violated when  is purely self-regarding, but I will not
need it in those cases.
TA2. If  is not purely self-regarding, then there exist 1  0 and 2  0 such that
lim2→∞ sup∆1∆20
(12+∆2)−(12)∆2
(1+∆12)−(12)∆1
≥ 0 and lim1→∞ inf∆1∆20
(12+∆2)−(12)∆2
(1+∆12)−(12)∆1
≥ 0.
4 Some Preliminaries
4.1 Characterizing UPE Transactions
As is standard, call a transaction (1 2) individually-rational if both players earn at least their
outside option: 1 (−→ (1 2)) ≥ 0 and 2 (−→ (1 2)) ≥ 0. Let
(1 2) ≡ arg max{(12)|2(−→ (12))≥0}1 (
−→ (1 2))
be called FM’s favorite transaction, her most-preferred transaction among the individually-
rational transactions. I will sometimes also call the resulting material payoﬀ pair (1 2) ≡
−→ (1 2) FM’s favorite transaction. Let
¡1 2¢ ≡ arg max{(12)|1(−→ (12))≥0}2 (−→ (1 2))
be called SM’s favorite transaction, his most-preferred transaction among the individually-
rational transactions, with corresponding material payoﬀ pair ¡1 2¢. Let the interpersonal indif-
ference curve of FM that goes through SM’s favorite transaction
¡1 2¢ be denoted 1, and let
the indiﬀerence curve of SM that goes through FM’s favorite transaction (1 2) be denoted 2.
Theorem 1. Suppose 1 and 2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. FM’s and SM’s favorite
transactions, (1 2) and ¡1 2¢, exist and are unique. The set of UPE material payoﬀ pairs
is a connected set that includes (1 2) and ¡1 2¢ and lies within the region enclosed by 1,
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2, and the MPE frontier. In addition, if 1 or 2 (or both) is monotonic, then the set of UPE
material payoﬀ pairs coincides exactly with the set of material payoﬀ pairs on the MPE frontier
between (1 2) and ¡1 2¢.
Figure 2a illustrates the relationship between the set of MPE material payoﬀ pairs and the set of
UPE material payoﬀ pairs in the case where neither player has monotonic social preferences. The
set of UPE material payoﬀ pairs lies within the region enclosed by 1, 2, and the MPE frontier
because both players prefer any material payoﬀ within that region to any material payoﬀ pair
outside that region. A material payoﬀ pair that is UPE either occurs at a tangency point between
the players’ indiﬀerence curves, or it occurs on the MPE frontier if the “relevant tangency” lies
outside the set of feasible material payoﬀ pairs.
Figure 2b illustrates the case where FM has monotonic social preferences. In this case, the set of
UPE material payoﬀ pairs is exactly the subset of the MPE frontier between (1 2) and ¡1 2¢.
Graphically, there cannot be a tangency between the players’ indiﬀerence curves in the interior of
the feasible set because both players’ indiﬀerence curves are downward-sloping. Intuitively, given
any interior material payoﬀ pair, there is an alternative material payoﬀ pair to the northeast that
SM strictly prefers because his preferences are joint-monotonic, and FM also prefers this alternative
because his preferences are monotonic.12
If one or both of the players is purely self-regarding, then Theorem 1 does not technically apply.
The set of UPE material payoﬀ pairs remains coincident with the set of material payoﬀ pairs on the
MPE frontier between (1 2) and ¡1 2¢, but depending on which player is purely self-regarding,
(1 2) = (∞−∞), ¡1 2¢ = (−∞∞), or both.
4.2 SM’s Behavior
Given FM’s action 1, SM can be thought of as selecting a pair of material payoﬀs on the (material
payoﬀ) budget curve  (1) = {−→ (1 2)}2∈R by his choice of action 2. For any value
of 1, the slope of the budget curve–the “price” of 1 in terms of 2–is denoted  (1 2) ≡
− 12
¯¯¯
(1)
= −1222  0. Given FM’s action 1, SM maximizes his preferences subject to this
budget curve.
It will sometimes be useful in this section and later to apply the standard tools of consumer
12Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, & Sobel (2008) independently prove a related result; their Theorem
3 implies that when at least one player has monotonic social preferences, material Pareto eﬃciency is a necessary
condition for utility Pareto eﬃciency.
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theory to analyze SM’s behavior. To facilitate doing so, it will be helpful to approximate SM’s
budget curve with the budget line that is tangent to the budget curve at his optimal material
payoﬀ pair. Since SM’s interpersonal indiﬀerence curves are convex, his optimum with respect
to his budget curve will also be an optimum with respect to this budget line. At a transaction
(1 2) that identifies a point −→ (1 2) on the budget curve  (1), the equation for the budget
line is 1 + 2 = , where  =  (1 2) is the slope of the budget curve at that point, and
 =  (1 2) ≡ 1 (1 2) +  (1 2)2 (1 2) is whatever level of “income” just suﬃces for
SM to aﬀord his optimal material payoﬀ pair. Figure 3 depicts a budget curve  (1) and the
approximating budget line  ( ).
Lemma 1 establishes results about SM’s behavior that are helpful for backward-inducting the
equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. For any 1, SM has a unique
optimal best response, 2 (1), that is a continuous function of 1. Moreover, if 2 is continuously
diﬀerentiable at some (b1 2 (b1)), then 21  0 and 22  0 at (b1 2 (b1)).
The lemma states that even if SM’s social preferences are non-monotonic in general, they will
be monotonic on the margin at his optimal action, as long as his optimum occurs at a smooth
region of his indiﬀerence curves. Graphically, if his optimal action occurs on a smooth region of his
indiﬀerence curves, then his optimal action must occur at a tangency point between an indiﬀerence
curve and the budget curve. Since the budget curve is always downward-sloping in the space of
material payoﬀs, the tangency point must occur at a downward-sloping region of the indiﬀerence
curve (see Figure 3). Intuitively, SM cannot be optimizing if, at his supposed optimum, he preferred
to reduce one of the player’s payoﬀs; since the “price” of 1 in terms of 2 is positive, he would be
able to get higher utility by either increasing or reducing his action.
Lemma 1 suggests that the generalization from monotonicity to joint-monotonicity for SM is
irrelevant for his behavior in a neighborhood of his optimum–and therefore, peeking ahead a bit,
for his behavior in a neighborhood of an equilibrium. If SM’s interpersonal indiﬀerence curves
are everywhere smooth, then this conclusion applies directly. Even if SM’s social preferences are
fairness-kinked, there are only two possibilities. Either his optimum occurs on a smooth region of his
indiﬀerence curves, in which case the result applies, or his optimum occurs at a kink, in which case
the weakening of monotonicity to joint-monotonicity does not matter because non-monotonicities
away from the kink are not relevant for behavior. Hence the lemma explains why conclusions that
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hold when both players have monotonic preferences will generalize to the case where SM instead
has joint-monotonic preferences.
The irrelevance of non-monotonicities in SM’s preferences may seem surprising, given that the
willingness of a second mover to reduce players’ material payoﬀs is a prominent component of the
evidence that motivates the models of fairness listed at the beginning of Section 3. The logic of the
lemma applies in the bilateral exchange game because the budget curve is both downward-sloping
(in the space of material payoﬀs) and continuous. If the budget curve were upward-sloping, SM’s
optimum could occur at a tangency between the budget set and an upward-sloping portion of his
indiﬀerence curve, violating the conclusion of the lemma. If the budget set were discrete, SM’s
optimum could occur at an upward-sloping part of his indiﬀerence curve since there is no tangency
condition for the optimum. In the prototypical laboratory payoﬀ-allocation decision problem, there
are two options available, with the “unfair” option giving higher material payoﬀs to both players
than the “fair” option does. Since the budget set is discrete and “upward-sloping,” Lemma 1
does not apply; an individual with joint-monotonic social preferences might prefer the materially-
dominated “fair” option, even though an individual with monotonic social preferences never would.
Relatedly, Lemma 1 implies that SM, if he had the option, would never choose to “punish” FM
for taking a low action by choosing a material payoﬀ pair that is materially-dominated by some
point on the budget curve. In contrast, in a two-player sequential-move game with discrete action
spaces–such as the much-studied “ultimatum game” (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze 1982)–
a SM with the very same joint-monotonic social preferences might well choose to punish FM by
choosing a material payoﬀ pair that is worse for both players (see Rabin 1997).
The following proposition gives conditions under which SM’s optimal action is increasing in
FM’s action. A straightforward observation is that if FM is purely self-regarding, a higher transfer
by FM leads to a higher transfer by SM at any equilibrium. If it did not, FM could obtain higher
material payoﬀ (and hence higher utility) by reducing her action. However, the proposition is
applicable away from equilibrium and even if FM is not purely self-regarding.
Proposition 1. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. Suppose 1
³12
22
´
≥ 0.
If 2 is (weakly) locally normal in 1 at ( (b1 2 (b1)) ;  (b1 2 (b1))), then 2 (1) is (weakly)
increasing in 1 at b1. Hence if 2 is (weakly) normal in 1, then 2 (1) is (weakly) increasing
in 1 at all b1.
The assumption that 1
³12
22
´
≥ 0 states that, holding SM’s action constant, an increase
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in FM’s action makes FM’s material payoﬀ weakly cheaper relative to SM’s material payoﬀ. It is
satisfied when the actions enter the material payoﬀ functions as complements in the sense that FM’s
material payoﬀ function is weakly supermodular in the “goods” (−1 2) and SM’s material payoﬀ
function is weakly supermodular in the “goods” (1−2)–as in Examples 1 and 2.13 Whenever
1
³12
22
´
≥ 0, normality of 2 in 1 ensures that 2 (1) is increasing in 1. To understand
why, consider an increase in FM’s action. If the price of FM’s material payoﬀ remained the same as
before, normality of 2 in 1 would imply that SM prefers to increase his action. To the extent that
FM’s material payoﬀ becomes cheaper, the incentive for SM to increase his action is reinforced.
A reciprocity motive–roughly speaking, a preference to behave kindly toward individuals who
behave kindly–is built in to some fairness models (e.g., Rabin 1993; Cox, Friedman, & Sadiraj
2008), but not the ones listed at the beginning of Section 3. Reciprocity cannot be fully captured in
models where utility depends only on the players’ material payoﬀs, as I assume here. An influential
defense of using models without a built-in reciprocity motive is that they are simpler to analyze,
while nonetheless generating similar behavior (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt 2003). Proposition 1 shows
that, for the usual payoﬀ specifications of the bilateral exchange game, normality of  is the critical
implicit assumption that causes SM to behave in a way that looks like reciprocity in commonly-used
functional forms for social preferences defined only over material payoﬀs.
4.3 FM’s Behavior
FM chooses her action 1 anticipating the reaction 2 (1) of SM. Lemma 2 summarizes key obser-
vations about FM’s behavior.
Lemma 2. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. Then:
1. There exists a unique b1 such that the resulting transaction (b1 2 (b1)) is MPE. This trans-
action is SM’s favorite transaction
¡1 2¢, and it is UPE.
2. An equilibrium exists. Moreover, if 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0, then an equilibrium exists in which the
players exchange rather than taking their outside options.
The first part of Lemma 2 is the surprising statement that SM’s favorite transaction is the only
MPE transaction that is possible for FM to induce. To understand why, note that there is exactly
13The assumption that 1
12
22

≥ 0 is also satisfied by the material payoﬀ functions typically used in gift-
exchange experiments, mentioned in footnote 3, which are weakly supermodular on the restricted domain of the
actions.
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one budget curve (corresponding to a particular value of 1) passing through each MPE material
payoﬀ pair. At that MPE material payoﬀ pair, the budget curve is tangent to the MPE fron-
tier. Therefore, if and only if a MPE material payoﬀ pair is maximal with respect to the budget
curve–i.e., an optimal choice for SM–it is also maximal with respect to the MPE frontier–i.e.,
a favorite transaction for SM. Since SM’s favorite transaction exists, is unique, and is UPE, the
result follows. Because of this result, I will sometimes refer to SM’s favorite transaction as “the”
eﬃcient transaction, even though technically there are many other MPE transactions.
This first part of the lemma has an immediate corollary: SM’s favorite transaction is the only
candidate for an equilibrium that is MPE. In turn, that observation has two important ramifications.
First, because it is his favorite transaction, SM never prefers to deviate. Therefore, a necessary
condition for an equilibrium to be MPE is 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0: FM does not prefer to deviate from
SM’s favorite transaction. For this reason, subsequent sections will focus on whether FM has an
incentive to take the action that induces the eﬃcient transaction.
Second, even when the equilibrium of the bilateral exchange game is eﬃcient, FM would always
be better oﬀ with a contract determined by Coase/Nash bargaining, as long as writing and enforcing
a contract is not too costly. The Nash bargaining solution will select a UPE transaction that is in
between FM’s favorite transaction and SM’s favorite transaction, depending on the agents’ relative
bargaining power. At any of these transactions, FM gets higher utility than she does at SM’s
favorite transaction.
Part 2 addresses existence of equilibrium. This equilibrium will involve FM choosing her outside
option if SM’s optimal response to any possible 1 resulted in lower utility for FM than her outside
payoﬀ. A suﬃcient condition for trade to occur in equilibrium is that FM prefers SM’s favorite
transaction to her own outside option: 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0. This condition is suﬃcient because (from
Part 1) there exists an action for FM that induces SM’s favorite transaction.
Hence 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0 is both a suﬃcient condition for trade to occur and a necessary condition
for the equilibrium of the game to be MPE. Intuitively, this condition means that holding constant
FM’s social preferences, SM is neither too selfish nor too altruistic. If SM were too selfish, then 1
would be so small that FM would prefer her outside option to
¡1 2¢. If SM were too altruistic,
then 2 would be so small that FM would prefer her outside option to ¡1 2¢.
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5 Necessary Conditions for the Equilibrium to be Eﬃcient
This section gives necessary conditions for the equilibrium of the bilateral exchange game to be
eﬃcient.
Theorem 2. Suppose 1 and 2 are joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, and potentially fairness-
kinked. If the equilibrium (1 2 (1)) is MPE, then (1 2 (1)) is SM’s favorite transaction, and
1 (−→ (1 2 (1))) ≥ 0. Furthermore, at least one of the following must be true:
1. FM’s favorite transaction is the same as SM’s favorite transaction, i.e., (1 2) = ¡1 2¢.
2. (12(1))1 = 0.
3. 2 is fairness-kinked at −→ (1 2 (1)) 
Two of the necessary conditions for the equilibrium to be MPE were discussed previously, in the
context of Lemma 2, but are stated formally here: if the equilibrium transaction is MPE, then it
must be SM’s favorite transaction
¡1 2¢, and it must be true that 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0. The third
necessary condition is that at least one of three things must be true. Possibility (1) (the least
interesting) is that FM and SM share the same favorite transaction. That transaction would then
be the equilibrium, and it would be MPE (as well as UPE). Possibility (2) is that FM’s action does
not aﬀect the slope of the budget curve at the equilibrium transaction, and possibility (3) is that
SM’s indiﬀerence curve is kinked at the equilibrium transaction.
To understand the economic intuition for possibilities (2) and (3), there are four steps. The
first step is to notice that when FM’s action deviates from the equilibrium 1 to some other
level 1 +∆, the resulting change in the material payoﬀs can be decomposed into a “substitution
eﬀect” and an “income eﬀect.” The original material payoﬀ pair ¡1 2¢ is SM’s most-preferred
point on the original budget curve  ¡1¢, and some new material payoﬀ pair (01 02) is SM’s
most-preferred point on the new budget curve  ¡1 +∆¢. SM’s original optimization problem
can be reconceptualized as choosing the most-preferred point on the budget line that first-order
approximates the original budget curve because SM’s optimal choice,
¡1 2¢, is the same in both
optimization problems. Similarly, (01 02) is not only SM’s most-preferred point on the budget
curve  ¡1 +∆¢, but also SM’s most-preferred point on the budget line that approximates it.
Figure 4 draws the movement from
¡1 2¢ to (01 02) but shows only the budget lines rather
than the budget curves. Since SM is now formally analogous to a consumer who is deciding how
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much of the two “goods” e1 (; ) and e2 (; ) to “consume” as a function of price and income,
his response to a change in the budget line can be characterized by the Slutsky decomposition into
an income eﬀect and a substitution eﬀect.
The second step is to recognize that at an MPE equilibrium, the income eﬀect is second order.
Notice that the budget line at the MPE material payoﬀ pair −→ ¡1 2 ¡1¢¢ is tangent to the MPE
frontier. Therefore, for the relative price  ¡1 2 ¡1¢¢, the material payoﬀ pair −→ ¡1 2 ¡1¢¢
maximizes income. By an envelope argument, the income eﬀect is second order.
The third step is to realize that at an MPE equilibrium, the substitution eﬀect must equal zero.
If the substitution eﬀect were not zero, then by marginally deviating from the equilibrium action 1
to some other action 1 +∆, FM could cause SM to choose a material payoﬀ pair that is either–
depending on whether FM chooses ∆  0 or ∆  0–slightly northwest or slightly southeast of¡1 2¢. Moreover, since the income eﬀect is second order, the northwest and southeast material
payoﬀ pairs that FM could induce by deviating would, to a first-order approximation, also be
points on the MPE frontier. Since FM’s favorite transaction does not coincide with SM’s favorite
transaction, FM would prefer over
¡1 2¢ whichever one of these is closer to her own favorite
transaction. But then 1 would not be optimal for FM. Hence if 1 is in fact FM’s optimal action,
then the substitution eﬀect must equal zero.
The fourth and final step is to notice that possibilities (2) and (3) correspond to the two possible
ways that the substitution eﬀect can equal zero. The budget lines may be parallel shifts, in which
case there is no change in relative price; that is (2). Alternatively, optimal consumption may occur
at a kink in the consumer’s indiﬀerence curves, in which case the consumer’s optimal consumption
bundle does not change in response to a Slutsky-compensated change in price; that is (3). In both
possibilities, since the substitution eﬀect is zero, the income eﬀect dominates despite being second
order.14
The intuition for Theorem 2 in terms of a substitution eﬀect and an income eﬀect explains why
14The intuition for Theorem 2 in terms of income and substitution eﬀects is a contribution relative to existing
work about the closely-related rotten kid game. Bergstrom (1989) and Dijkstra (2007) identified the (12(1))1 = 0
condition as crucial for the rotten kid theorem to be true and provided a partial intuition. Both authors point out
that when the condition fails, FM can influence the slope of the budget curve faced by SM by marginally adjusting 1.
Bergstrom (1989, p.1145) writes that FM can “‘twist’ the [budget curve] in a way that is favorable to her...[making
it] the ‘cheaper’ to supply 1 and the more ‘expensive’ to supply 2. Consequently...the more 1 [SM] will buy.”
Dijkstra (2007, pp.99-100) elaborates on this argument by presenting a diagram illustrating how FM might choose
an action leading to a non-MPE transaction when (12(1))1 6= 0. In terms of the discussion above, this argument
describes the substitution eﬀect but misses the income eﬀect and the significance of the original consumption bundle
being MPE, which ensures that the income eﬀect is second order. The intuition about the income eﬀect also makes
clear that when FM is purely self-regarding, normality of SM’s social preferences is a necessary condition for an MPE
equilibrium, as discussed next.
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normality of SM’s social preferences will play an important role in possibility (2). For FM’s actions
in a neighborhood of 1, there is no substitution eﬀect, only an income eﬀect. Therefore, if FM is
purely self-regarding, local normality of 2 in 1 is another necessary condition for ¡1 2 ¡1¢¢ to
be an equilibrium.
The remaining question about Theorem 2 is for what material payoﬀ functions possibility (2) in
fact holds. Dijkstra (2007, his Lemma 1) answered this question: (12(1))1 = 0 at SM’s favorite
transaction
¡1 2 ¡1¢¢ if and only if the material payoﬀ functions are locally conditionally trans-
ferable at
¡1 2 ¡1¢¢. Furthermore, Dijkstra (2007) showed that the material payoﬀ functions are
locally conditionally transferable at an MPE transaction (b1b2) if and only if, in a neighborhood
of (b1b2), the material payoﬀ functions can be approximated as globally conditionally transferable
or (1 1)-additively-separable.15
The discussion has been about conditions for the equilibrium to be MPE, which will also be
UPE (by Lemma 2). Theorem 6 in the Online Appendix characterizes the necessary conditions for
the equilibrium to be UPE. There is one potentially empirically-relevant case where an equilibrium
may be UPE but not MPE: both players’ social preferences are fairness-kinked at the equilibrium,
and the two players have diﬀerent fairness rules at the equilibrium. This situation might occur if
the two agents have diﬀerent, self-serving ideas about what is fair. An implication of Theorem 6
is that if one or both players’ interpersonal indiﬀerence curves are smooth, then the equilibrium
is UPE if and only if it is MPE, in which case Theorem 2 is a complete characterization of the
necessary conditions for eﬃciency.
6 Suﬃcient Conditions for the Equilibrium to be Eﬃcient
The previous section showed that there are two interesting cases in which the equilibrium could
be MPE: (1) the budget lines that approximate the budget curves are parallel shifts, and (2) SM’s
interpersonal indiﬀerence curve is kinked at the equilibrium. This section explores these cases in
more detail, giving suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium to be both MPE and UPE.
The intuition for both cases is fundamentally the same: SM’s behavior aligns the players’
material incentives by ensuring that the players’ material payoﬀs increase or decrease together as
15 In an influential paper about the closely-related rotten kid theorem, Bergstrom (1989) had argued but did
not prove that global conditional transferability is necessary for possibility (2). Dijkstra’s (2007) result shows that
possibility (2) actually holds under a wider class of material payoﬀ functions that includes (1 1)-additively-separable
material payoﬀ functions, as well as any other material payoﬀ functions that happen to be locally conditionally
transferable at
1 2 1.
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FM varies her action. FM will choose the action that maximizes both players’ material payoﬀs if
FM is purely self-regarding or altruistic, leading to an MPE equilibrium. Since this transaction is
SM’s favorite transaction, it will also be UPE.
6.1 Eﬃcient Case I: Budget Curves Are Parallel Shifts
Recall from Section 5 that when FM varies her action, there is just an income eﬀect with no
substitution eﬀect. If FM is purely self-regarding or altruistic, the (global) normality of 2 is
suﬃcient to ensure that the equilibrium is unique, MPE, and UPE.16
Theorem 3. Suppose 1 is quasi-concave, and suppose 2 is joint-monotonic, quasi-concave,
and normal. Suppose the material payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transferable. If 1
is monotonic or purely self-regarding, and if 1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ ≥ 0 at SM’s favorite transaction¡1 2¢, then the unique equilibrium transaction is ¡1 2¢, which is MPE and UPE.
Since the material payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transferable, FM’s action aﬀects the
level of “income” but not the “price” faced by SM. Because 2 is normal, SM will choose his action
such that both players’ material payoﬀs are increasing in the total surplus to be divided. Hence,
FM maximizes both players’ material payoﬀs by choosing the unique action that leads to an MPE
outcome. Figure 5a illustrates Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 assumes that the material payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transfer-
able, even though Proposition 1 showed that (1 1)-additive-separability is also consistent with
(12(1))1 = 0 at
¡1 2¢. The reason is that global conditional transferability implies that
(12(1))1 = 0 at all 1, while (1 1)-additive-separability only implies it in a neighborhood of
1. Therefore, global conditional transferability but not (1 1)-additive-separability ensures that
SM’s behavior will align the players’ material incentives at all 1, in turn ensuring that 1 is FM’s
global optimum, not just a local optimum.17
Theorem 3 could be paraphrased: Fixing the material payoﬀ functions and SM’s social pref-
erences satisfying the assumptions of the theorem, then–depending on FM’s social preferences–
either the equilibrium will be no trade, or the equilibrium transaction will be MPE and UPE. To
understand why, notice that if 1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ ¤ 0, then FM prefers her outside option to the
16 If FM is purely self-regarding, the assumption of normality of 2 can be weakened to normality of 2 in 1.
17Dijkstra’s (2007) Proposition 2 gives the impression that the rotten kid theorem holds if the material payoﬀ
functions are globally conditionally transferable or (1 1)-additive-separable. As written, the proposition is true,
but it assumes that “all agents’ second order conditions are satisfied” without giving suﬃcient conditions for FM’s
local optimum to be a global optimum.
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action 1 that maximizes her utility conditional on trading. In that case, the equilibrium will be
no trade. On the other hand, if 1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ ≥ 0 so that the equilibrium involves trade, then it
will occur at
¡1 2¢.
As long as the specified assumptions of the theorem hold, the conclusion does not depend on
exactly how selfish or altruistic SM is, or whether 2 is kinked or smooth; FM will choose the same
action in any case, since with globally conditionally transferable material payoﬀs, there is a unique
eﬃcient action such that the budget curve coincides with the MPE frontier. For that reason, loosely
speaking (since there is no uncertainty in the model), FM would choose the eﬃcient action even
if she were uncertain about SM’s social preferences and hence uncertain about the action SM will
choose.18
Theorem 3 holds regardless of whether SM’s social preferences are monotonic or not, as long
as they are joint-monotonic. However, if FM’s social preferences are joint-monotonic but not
monotonic, then the conclusion of Theorem 3 may not hold. SM’s behavior aligns the material
incentives of the two players, but if FM has non-monotonic social preferences, then she may prefer
not to maximize the players’ material payoﬀs. Figure 5b illustrates an equilibrium that is neither
MPE not UPE.
6.2 Eﬃcient Case II: SM’s Social Preferences Are Fairness-Kinked
If SM’s best response 2 (b1) to some b1 occurs on the fairness rule at a point where SM’s social
preferences are strictly kinked, then SM behaves in accordance with the fairness rule in a neigh-
borhood of b1. That is, SM obeys his fairness rule locally. This observation, combined with the
fact that the fairness rule is upward-sloping, means that SM’s social preferences are locally normal
when his optimum occurs at a kink point. It follows that if SM’s indiﬀerence curve is (even very
slightly kinked) at his favorite transaction, then the action that induces SM’s favorite transaction
will be a local optimum for FM, if FM is purely self-regarding or altruistic. The central intuition for
how fairness-kinked social preferences can lead to an MPE equilibrium comes from this logic: The
fairness rule is characterized by the players’ material payoﬀs increasing or decreasing in tandem.
As long as SM’s favorite transaction occurs at a kink, SM responds to small changes in FM’s action
by adjusting his own action to ensure that the fairness rule remains satisfied. This behavior means
that both players’ material payoﬀs are increasing in the size of the pie, which gives FM an incentive
to maximize the size of the pie, as long as FM is purely self-regarding or altruistic.
18Becker (1974) made this same observation in the context of the rotten kid theorem.
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Theorem 4 provides suﬃcient conditions for SM’s favorite transaction to be the unique equi-
librium: FM is purely self-regarding or altruistic; the material payoﬀ functions 1 (1 2) and
2 (1 2) are (1 2)-additively-separable;19 FM’s favorite transaction gives higher material pay-
oﬀ to FM than SM’s favorite transaction does;20 and SM’s interpersonal preferences are normal
and suﬃciently kinked at his favorite transaction.
Theorem 4. Suppose 1 is quasi-concave, and suppose 2 is fairness-kinked, with 2 and 2
being joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, normal, and continuously twice-diﬀerentiable. Suppose 1
is either purely self-regarding, or strictly monotonic with FM’s favorite transaction (1 2) giving
higher material payoﬀ to FM than SM’s favorite transaction ¡1 2¢. Suppose the players’ material
payoﬀ function are (1 2)-additively-separable. Let (b1b2) denote the (necessarily unique) trans-
action with b1  1 such that 1(b1b2) = 1 ¡1 2¢ and 2(b1b2) = 0. If 1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ ≥ 0,
and if, at −→ ¡1 2¢,
2 = 2 (5)
2
2 − (1b2)21  0 (6)
2
2 − 
¡1 2¢ 21  0 (7)
then the unique equilibrium transaction is
¡1 2¢, which is MPE and UPE.
Equality (5) says that the SM’s favorite transaction is a material payoﬀ pair on the fairness rule.
Inequality (7) combined with 

21 − 
¡1 2¢ 22  0 imply that SM’s favorite transaction in fact
occurs at a strict kink in SM’s indiﬀerence curves. Inequality (6) is more stringent than 21 −
 ¡1 2¢ 22  0, ruling out that SM is not too altruistic at a particular, disadvantageously unfair
transaction, (b1b2). If SM puts negative weight on FM’s material payoﬀ at disadvantageously
unfair transactions, such as with “inequity averse” social preferences (1), then (6) is automatically
satisfied.
Normality of 2 plays a diﬀerent role in Theorem 4 than in Theorem 3. In Theorem 3, it ensured
that SM’s best-response function 2 (1) caused the players’ material payoﬀs to increase or decrease
19While additive-separability is helpful in the proof of Theorem 4, it is clearly not a necessary condition for the
equilibrium to occur at SM’s favorite transaction. Unfortunately, I do not know if a less restrictive assumption will
suﬃce.
20This assumption is more realistic than the opposite assumption. Together with the assumptions regarding
(12), its role is to rule out the possibility that some other action for FM gives FM higher material payoﬀ than
SM’s favorite transaction does. With the opposite assumption instead, analogous alternative suﬃcient conditions
could be formulated that rule out the possibility that some other action for FM gives FM lower material payoﬀ than
SM’s favorite transaction does.
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in tandem as 1 varies. However, in Theorem 4, the fairness rule plays that role. In Theorem 4,
normality in combination with (1 2)-additive-separability allows the aversion to disadvantageous
unfairness local to
¡1 2¢ from (6) to imply a suﬃcient aversion to disadvantageous unfairness on
the outside option indiﬀerence curve. Without normality, even if inducing SM’s favorite transaction
were a local optimum for FM, FM might earn a still greater material payoﬀ by taking a much
smaller action. Figure 6a illustrates the MPE/UPE equilibrium when SM has fairness-kinked social
preferences, and Figure 6b shows a way the equilibrium could fail to be eﬃcient if the assumptions
of Theorem 4 are not satisfied.
Like Theorem 3, Theorem 4 suggests that, given the theorem’s assumptions about material
payoﬀ functions and SM’s social preferences, then–depending on FM’s social preferences–either
the equilibrium will be no trade, or the equilibrium transaction will be MPE and UPE. Put another
way, these results roughly state that if SM is behaving according to a fairness rule, and if FM is
purely self-regarding or altruistic, then any trade that occurs will be eﬃcient. Unlike Theorem 3,
Theorem 4 does not require the material payoﬀ functions to be locally conditionally transferable,
and so applies to non-monetary trades, such as barter or exchange of favors. Moreover, as long as
SM adheres to a fairness rule that assigns larger material payoﬀ to both players as the pie increases,
any fairness rule can lead to an eﬃcient equilibrium, even if it is non-linear or self-serving.
Also like Theorem 3, the conclusions of Theorem 4 do not depend on whether SM’s social
preferences are monotonic or joint-monotonic, but the conclusions may not hold if FM ’s social
preferences are joint-monotonic. In Figure 6a, if FM had joint-monotonic preferences, his most-
preferred point on SM’s fairness rule–and therefore the equilibrium–could occur at an ineﬃcient
material payoﬀ pair.
In the informal discussion about Theorem 3, it was suggested that the theorem would hold even
if FM were uncertain about exactly what SM’s social preferences are. However, Theorem 4 requires
that FM know what fairness rule SM is following. Otherwise, FM would not know which action
would induce SM’s favorite transaction. Loosely speaking, there is “social value” in having SM’s
fairness rule be common knowledge. Social norms like 50-50 sharing may have the consequence of
providing common knowledge fairness rules.
28
7 Applications
While the previous sections developed results about the bilateral exchange game, this section dis-
cusses how those results may inform research on three topics: the rotten kid theorem, gift exchange
in laboratory experiments, and gift exchange in field settings.
7.1 The Rotten Kid Theorem
Recall the rotten kid game from Example 2: A child (FM) chooses how much to work for pay and
suﬀers convex cost of eﬀort  (1). Then the parent (SM) transfers some amount, 2, of family
income to the child. The material payoﬀs equal the respective private incomes divided by the
respective prices of consumption: 1 (1 2) = 1+2−(1)1 and 2 (1 2) = 2+1−22 . Family
income is the sum of the child’s income and the parent’s income, 1+ 2+1− (1). An outcome
of this game is MPE if and only if it maximizes family income.
The parent is assumed to be altruistic toward the child, with 2 (1 2) monotonic and normal
in both material payoﬀs, but the child may either be altruistic toward the parent or purely self-
regarding (a “rotten kid”): 1 (1 2) = 1. In Becker’s (1974, p.1080) original description of the
rotten kid theorem: “The major, and somewhat unexpected, conclusion is that if a [household]
head exists, other members are also motivated to maximize family income and consumption, even
if their welfare depends on their own consumption alone.”
Theorem 5 (Rotten Kid Theorem). Suppose 1 is quasi-concave, and either purely self-
regarding or monotonic. Suppose 2 is monotonic, quasi-concave, and normal. In the rotten kid
game (Example 2), the unique equilibrium transaction is SM’s favorite transaction
¡1 2¢, which
maximizes family income.
In subsequent work, Bergstrom (1989) and Dijkstra (2007) proved that the material payoﬀ functions
in Example 2 could be generalized; Dijkstra’s (2007) analysis suggested that global conditional
transferability is in fact suﬃcient for the theorem to hold.
The theorem has been interpreted as applying to family environments but not market environ-
ments because researchers have emphasized the role of altruism, which is assumed to be relevant
primarily within the family. One contribution of this paper is to point out that the rotten kid the-
orem logic applies in settings where the relevant social preference is a concern for fairness, which
appears to be widespread in interactions between unrelated individuals (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch,
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& Thaler 1986; Bewley 1999). One way that Theorem 3 generalizes Theorem 5 is in allowing SM to
have social preferences that are joint-monotonic but not monotonic. It follows fairly directly from
Lemma 1 that this relaxation does not matter for equilibrium behavior. Although only a minor
mathematical generalization, the relaxation of monotonicity is a major economic generalization
because it means that the surprising eﬃciency conclusion may be applicable in a far wider range
of settings.
Relative to existing work on the rotten kid theorem, the analysis in this paper provides three
new insights about the result and what drives it. First, intuitions have been incomplete about
why local (or global) conditional transferability of the material payoﬀ functions is important. The
analysis of substitution and income eﬀects in Section 5 shows that having a substitution eﬀect equal
to zero is what is crucial. Second, this paper suggests that normality has been underemphasized
in existing interpretations. Typical brief descriptions of the theorem focus on altruism and do
not mention normality.21 However, while monotonicity of SM’s social preferences can be relaxed,
normality of SM’s social preferences is crucial. Finally, Theorem 3 shows that the equilibrium is
UPE, in addition to MPE. Hence the eﬃciency result is even stronger than has been recognized.
7.2 Gift Exchange in the Field
In many bilateral exchange environments in the field, one player is an individual–a worker or
customer–who may be concerned with distributional fairness, while the other player is a firm,
who is plausibly profit-maximizing. If the purely self-regarding firm is modeled as FM, and the
fairness-minded person as SM, then Theorems 3 and 4 may apply.
Theorem 3 is applicable when the material payoﬀ functions satisfy local conditional transfer-
ability. This broad but restrictive class includes quasi-linearity in 2 as a special case, which is
typically considered a good model when SM’s action is a transfer of money to FM. This is true
when FM is a seller who provides a service, and SM is a (fair-minded) customer who decides how
much to pay for the service. It is not true when FM’s action is a transfer of money to SM, such
as when FM is a profit-maximizing employer who pays a wage, and SM is a (fair-minded) worker
who exerts eﬀort. Therefore, loosely speaking, the analysis in this paper suggests that an eﬃcient
outcome might be more likely in the former case than the latter.
21For example, Becker (1974, p.1076) summarizes the theorem: “If one member [of the family], call him the ‘head,’
cares suﬃciently about all other members to transfer general resources to them, redistribution of income among
members would not aﬀect the consumption of any member, as long as the head continues to contribute to all.”
Bergstrom (1989, p.1139) writes that “[the rotten kid theorem] tells us that a suﬃciently benevolent household head
would automatically internalize all the external eﬀects that family members have on each other.”
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Theorem 4 applies when SM has “suﬃciently fairness-kinked” social preferences at his favorite
transaction (whether or not the material payoﬀ functions satisfy local conditional transferability).
This may be a reasonable model when there is a salient fairness rule that applies to the specified
transaction, e.g., an agreed-upon rate of exchange between amount of work that SM will provide
and money FM will pay.
The results of the paper would appear to raise a puzzle: if social preferences alone will generate
an eﬃcient equilibrium in a variety of settings (as predicted by the theory), why do instances
of exchange based solely on social preferences appear to be much less common in the field than
exchange based on contracts (as judged by casual observation)? I believe that part of the answer
is that, if contracting is possible, FM can generally do better at an eﬃcient contract than at an
eﬃcient equilibrium of the bilateral exchange game, which necessarily occurs at the transaction on
the Pareto frontier most preferred by SM. I suspect another part of the answer is that in many field
setting, SM is too selfish. The theory implies the equilibrium can be eﬃcient if the equilibrium
is better for FM than not trading, but that condition will fail if SM’s most-preferred transaction
assigns too little material payoﬀ to FM.
7.3 Gift Exchange in the Lab
Laboratory experiments have generated evidence of gift exchange and usually report moderate
levels of eﬃciency (see Falk & Fehr, 2010, for a review).22 The analysis in this paper suggests two
reasons why the extent of eﬃciency measured from gift exchange in the lab should not be expected
to generalize to field settings.
First, the fairness rule that is usually salient in the lab–a 50-50 split of monetary payoﬀs–
is often not the relevant fairness rule in field settings. In the lab, where the monetary payoﬀs
functions are common knowledge, the fairness rule that equates monetary payoﬀs is salient and
easy to implement. In a field setting such as manager-worker gift exchange, since disutility of eﬀort
is not easily measured in monetary units, this fairness rule would likely not be relevant to a worker.
Some other fairness rule–such as a usual rate of exchange between salary and output–might
instead be salient. Since individuals may feel more compelled to follow one of these fairness rules
22Note that when eﬃciency is measured in the lab, it is material Pareto eﬃciency, not utility Pareto eﬃciency. In
the lab, monetary payoﬀs are specified as a function of the players’ actions, 1 (1 2) and 2 (1 2). “Eﬃciency”
is operationalized as what might be called “money Pareto eﬃciency,” defined by the condition 1(12)11(12)2 =2(12)1
2(12)2 . Under the plausible assumption that players’ material payoﬀs are increasing functions of the amount
of money earned–i.e., 1 (1 2) = 1 (1 (1 2)) and 2 (1 2) = 2 (2 (1 2)), with 01 02  0–a transaction
(1 2) is money Pareto eﬃcient if and only if it is MPE.
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than the other, it is problematic to generalize the amount of eﬃciency measured in the lab due
to the equal-split fairness rule to the amount of eﬃciency expected in the field due to a diﬀerent
fairness rule.
Second, as mentioned above, in many field settings, it is plausible that only one of the play-
ers cares about fairness, while in the lab, both players are drawn from a common pool of fair-
minded experimental participants. Theorems 3 and 4 apply when FM has purely self-regarding or
monotonic social preferences, but not necessarily when FM has joint-monotonic preferences that
are not monotonic. Some FMs in the lab may prefer a higher relative material payoﬀ even if it
means a lower absolute payoﬀ. To the extent that they can achieve this by choosing an ineﬃciently
low action, the amount of eﬃciency measured in the lab will understate what can be expected in
analogous field settings where FM would be purely self-regarding.
8 Discussion
The analysis in this paper could be extended in several directions. First, while this paper has focused
on bilateral exchange, there are of course important multi-player field settings. How conclusions
from the bilateral exchange environment generalize will depend on the nature of the multilateral
social preferences. For example, suppose a profit-maximizing firm simultaneously oﬀers a wage to
each of several workers, and then each worker sequentially chooses his eﬀort level. If each worker
cares about the fairness of his own bilateral transaction with the firm, then the analysis in this paper
applies immediately to each bilateral transaction. Consistent with that possibility, Maximiano,
Sloof, & Sonnemans (2007) find in a laboratory labor market that behavior in the presence of other
workers is nearly identical to behavior when there is only a single worker. However, if each worker
has social preferences over all players’ material payoﬀs, then the analysis becomes more complex.
Second, the analysis could be extended to allow each player to be uncertain about the other
player’s material payoﬀ function and social preferences (see, e.g., Fehr, Klein, & Schmidt 2007).
In some cases, uncertainty about social preferences will make little diﬀerence–such as when a
purely self-regarding FM believes that a suﬃciently large proportion of second-mover types will
adhere to a 50-50 sharing rule. In that case, it is still optimal for FM to take the action that
induces a 50-50-rule-following SM to respond eﬃciently. However, in many cases, it seems likely
that uncertainty will reduce eﬃciency. For example, even if all second-mover types behave in
accordance with a fairness rule, if each adheres to a diﬀerent fairness rule, then FM’s uncertainty
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will make it optimal for him to play against a “representative SM” who has smooth preferences.
As a result, the equilibrium may be materially Pareto ineﬃcient.
Third, while I have assumed that other-regarding behavior is driven exclusively by preferences
over material payoﬀs, the analysis could be extended to incorporate more complex mechanisms that
are known to influence social behavior. One such mechanism is signaling: A purely self-regarding
agent may appear to be other-regarding because he is signaling to others (or to himself) that he
is a fair-minded type (e.g., Andreoni & Bernheim 2009). I conjecture that the equilibrium of the
bilateral exchange game will be very similar if the players’ other-regarding behavior is driven by
signaling instead of preferences over the distribution of material payoﬀs. If the players’ behavior
can be represented as if it were generated by distributional social preferences, then the predictions
about equilibrium behavior are the same whether the behavior is in fact the result of distributional
preferences or signaling.23
Finally, another mechanism that can generate other-regarding behavior is intentions-based reci-
procity: a player’s distributional preferences may depend on his beliefs about the other player’s
distributional preferences. In particular, he may prefer to treat more kindly someone whom he
thinks would treat him kindly (Rabin 1993). In work that is closely related to the present paper,
Netzer & Schmutzler (2009) study a bilateral exchange game where FM is purely self-regarding,
and SM puts positive weight on FM’s material payoﬀ only to the extent he believes FM has be-
haved kindly toward him. With intentions-based reciprocity, it is not clear how to define “utility
Pareto eﬃciency” because preferences depend on endogenous beliefs, so Netzer & Schmutzler focus
on material Pareto eﬃciency. They argue that when FM is purely self-regarding and SM’s behavior
is driven by intentions-based reciprocity, the equilibrium is generically materially Pareto ineﬃcient
because SM is unwilling to reciprocate high actions by FM, which are interpreted as attempts at
material-payoﬀ maximization instead of as kind motivation. However, Charness & Rabin (2002) ar-
gue that intentions-based reciprocity becomes important only in response to a first-mover’s unkind
behavior, while the distributional social preferences I study here drive a second-mover’s behavior
when FM has behaved kindly. If so, the analysis in this paper is more relevant than the impli-
cations of intentions-based reciprocity for gift-exchange settings where both parties are gaining
from the transaction. For the more general case where the players’ behavior is influenced both by
intentions-based reciprocity and distributional social preferences, the equilibrium is not yet known.
23A diﬀerence is that if the players’ underlying preferences are actually purely self-regarding, then the set of UPE
transactions is identical with the set of MPE transactions. However, if the equilibrium occurs at SM’s favorite
transaction, then it will still be MPE (and therefore UPE).
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Online Appendix: Proofs
(Not for publication)
We begin with a technical lemma before proving the results in the text.
Technical Lemma Suppose 1 and 2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. Then:
1. The set of individually-rational transactions
 ≡ {(1 2) | 1(−→ (1 2)) ≥ 0 2(−→ (1 2)) ≥ 0}
is non-empty and compact, as is the set of payoﬀ pairs  ≡ {−→ (1 2) | (1 2) ∈ }.
2. Along any graph of the form ( (2)  2), where  is a continuous, decreasing, weakly concave
function,  has a unique maximum ∗2 and strictly decreases as 2 moves away from this
maximum, for  = 1 2. Moreover, the MPE frontier and each budget curve  (1) is such a
graph.
Proof of part 1: The transaction (1 2) = (0 0) gives material payoﬀs −→ (0 0) = (0 0)
and utilities 1 (−→ (0 0)) = 2 (−→ (0 0)) = 0 (by A4), so both sets are non-empty. By TA2, 
necessarily lies to the north and east (respectively) of two lines 1 = 1 ≤ 1 and 2 = 2 ≤ 2,
i.e.,  ⊆ {(1 2) | 1(1 2) ≥ 1 2(1 2) ≥ 2}. Hence  is closed and bounded and therefore
compact. It follows from A1 and A6 that  is also closed and bounded and therefore compact.
Proof of part 2: WLOG, consider 2. We first show that for any real number , the set
{2 | 2 ( (2)  2) ≥ } is an interval (possibly unbounded). Let 02  002 be two values in this
set. By construction, 2 ≥  at ( (02)  02) and ( (002)  002). It follows that 2 ≥  at ( (02)  002).
(To see this, let  = max{ ∈ [ (002)   (02)] | 2( 002) ≥ } (the maximum exists by continuity).
If ¯ =  (02) then we are done, so assume ¯   (02). By joint-monotonicity, we can choose ˆ ˆ
with  (002)  ˆ and ¯  ˆ   (02) so that 2(ˆ ˆ)  2(¯ 002) ≥ . The line segment connecting
( (02)  02) and (ˆ ˆ) meets the line  = 002 at a point with some -coordinate strictly between ¯
and  (02). By quasi-concavity, the value of 2 at this point is ≥ . This contradicts the maximality
of ¯.) Now, for any 02  2  002, the point ( (2)  2) lies weakly inside the triangle defined by
these three points since  is weakly concave. Since 2 is quasi-concave, 2( (2)  2) ≥  also.
This shows that there cannot be three values 02  2  002 with 2( (02)  02)  2( (2)  2) 
2( (002)  002). It follows that on the graph ( (2)  2), 2 is either weakly monotonic everywhere,
or weakly increasing on (−∞ e2) and weakly decreasing on (e2∞) for some e2.
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We now show that 2 cannot be constant on any interval along the graph. Suppose 2 assumes
the constant value  on the interval [02 002]. Quasi-concavity implies that 2 is ≥  at the point
(0 0) =
µ
(02)+(002)
2  
0
2+002
2
¶
. For suﬃciently small   0, the box [0 0 + ]× [0 0 + ] lies
entirely below and to the left of the curve  = {( (2)  2) | 02  2  002}. Joint-monotonicity
ensures that 2 assumes a value 0   at some point (0 0) inside this box. Now, let  =
{( ) |  ≥ 0  ≥ 0 2( ) ≥ 2(0 0)}. We know that  does not intersect  because
2 ≥ 0 on , whereas 2 takes on the constant value  on , by assumption.  is closed and
convex, and must then be bounded (by the lines  = 0  = 0, as well as by the curve  since
(0 0) ∈ ), so it is compact. Hence we can choose a point ( ) ∈  with  +  maximal. But
by joint-monotonicity there exists 00  0 00  0 with 2(00 00)  2(0 0) ≥ 0, contradicting
maximality. It follows that 2 cannot be constant on [02 002] after all.
Next, we rule out that 2 is monotonic along the entire graph; in particular, we show that for
any ( (2)  2), there are 02  2  002 such that 2( (02)  02)  2( (2)  2)  2( (002)  002).
Since the graph is weakly concave, the indiﬀerence curve going through ( (2)  2) is either tangent
to the budget curve or by TA2 intersects it at ( (2)  2) and at some other point ( (0002 )  0002 ).
In either cases, the claim follows immediately.
We complete the proof by showing that each budget curve and the MPE frontier have graphs
of the form ( (2)  2), where  is a continuous, decreasing, weakly concave function. We start
with the budget curve. Fix action 1. Since  (1) ≡ {−→ (1 2)}2∈R, 12
¯¯¯
(1)
= 1222 . We
can represent the graph of the budget curve as ( (2)  2), where 2 = 12
¯¯¯
(1)
 0, hence
 is continuous and decreasing. Now, we can parameterize the graph of the budget curve as
( (2 (2))  2 (2)). Note that 2 (002)  2 (02) if 002  02 (from A2). Weak quasi-concavity of
the material payoﬀ functions (which follows from A3) implies that 2
³12
22
´
= 2
³ 
2
´
 0.
Hence  is strictly concave. A1-A3 imply that the MPE frontier has a graph of the form ( (2)  2),
where  is a continuous, decreasing, weakly concave function (a standard result about the “utility
possibility frontier” when utility is purely self-regarding).
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Theorem 1. Suppose 1 and 2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. FM’s and SM’s favorite
transactions, (1 2) and ¡1 2¢, exist and are unique. The set of UPE material payoﬀ pairs
is a connected set that includes (1 2) and ¡1 2¢ and lies within the region enclosed by 1,
2, and the MPE frontier. In addition, if 1 or 2 (or both) is monotonic, then the set of UPE
2
material payoﬀ pairs coincides exactly with the set of material payoﬀ pairs on the MPE frontier
between (1 2) and ¡1 2¢.
Proof: We will prove that SM’s favorite transaction exists, and deduce the result for FM by
symmetry. Since the space of individually-rational payoﬀs is compact (by Technical Lemma), there
must be some point that maximizes 2. Joint-monotonicity implies that a maximizing material
payoﬀ pair must lie on the MPE frontier, and Technical Lemma implies that there must be a
unique material payoﬀ pair that achieves the maximum utility. Since this payoﬀ pair is on the
MPE frontier, there is in turn exactly one transaction
¡1 2¢ that achieves these payoﬀs. To see
that, we will work in the (1 2)−plane and study the material indiﬀerence curves for FM and
SM. At a MPE action pair, we must have a tangency between the material indiﬀerence curves:
−1112 = 21
¯¯¯
1=1
= 21
¯¯¯
2=2
= −2122 . Since the material indiﬀerence curves are strictly
convex in (−1 2) and (1−2), respectively (by A3), 22(1)2
¯¯¯
1=1
 0 and 22(1)2
¯¯¯
2=2
 0,
SM’s favorite transaction is unique.
FM’s favorite material payoﬀ pair (1 2) is UPE because there is no alternative feasible mate-
rial payoﬀ pair that FM prefers. Analogously, SM’s favorite material payoﬀs pair ¡1 2¢ is UPE
because there is no alternative feasible material payoﬀ pair that SM prefers. There does not exist a
UPE material payoﬀ pair (b1 b2) outside of the region enclosed by 1, 2, and the MPE frontier
because by construction (b1 b2) is worse than (1 2) or ¡1 2¢ for both FM and SM.
To see that the set of UPE material pairs is a connected set, consider the problem −→ ¡2¢ ∈
argmax{−→ :−→ ∈2(−→ )=2} 1 (−→ ). The Maximum Theorem (e.g., Sundaram 1996, p.235) implies
that −→ ¡2¢ is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. It follows that ©−→ ¡2¢ª2∈[02(12)]
is a connected set. But
©−→ ¡2¢ª2∈[02(12)] is exactly the set of UPE material payoﬀ pairs.
For the additional result, suppose WLOG that 1 is monotonic. Note that no material payoﬀ
pair (01 02) that is strictly within the materially-feasible set can be UPE; by joint-monotonicity
of 2, there is some feasible material payoﬀ pair (001 002)À (01 02) that SM prefers, and FM also
prefers (001 002) by monotonicity. Finally, any material payoﬀ pair (01 02) on the MPE frontier
between (1 2) and ¡1 2¢ is UPE. For contradiction, suppose (01 02) is not UPE. Then there
exists another material payoﬀ pair (001 002) giving at least equally high utility to both players. We
may assume (001 002) to be MPE; if not, then by joint-monotonicity, there exists an MPE material
payoﬀ pair giving yet higher utility to both players that we can use instead. Suppose (1 2) is
northwest of
¡1 2¢ on the MPE frontier; the argument is analogous if the positioning is reversed.
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If (001 002) is northwest of (01 02) on the MPE frontier, then (001 002)  (01 02) 
¡1 2¢ lie in that
order along the MPE frontier, and 2 (001 002) ≥ 2 (01 02)  2
¡1 2¢; but this contradicts the
Technical Lemma. On the other hand, if (001 002) is southeast of (01 02) on the MPE frontier, then
(1 2)  (01 02)  (001 002) lie in that order along the MPE frontier, and 1 (1 2)  1 (01 02) ≤
1 (001 002); but this also contradicts the Technical Lemma.
¤
Lemma 1. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. For any 1, SM has a unique
optimal best response, 2 (1), that is a continuous function of 1. Moreover, if 2 is continuously
diﬀerentiable at some (b1 2 (b1)), then 21  0 and 22  0 at (b1 2 (b1)).
Technical Lemma immediately gives existence and uniqueness of an optimal action 2 (1).
The Maximum Theorem (e.g., Sundaram 1996, p.235) can now be applied (where we can ignore
the compactness requirement on the budget curve since we have already proved existence of an
optimal action) to show that 2 (1) is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. Since 2 (1) is
single-valued, it is a continuous function.
Since 2 is continuously diﬀerentiable at −→ (b1 2 (b1)), SM’s unique optimum is characterized
by the first-order condition, 22 (
−→ (b1 2)) = 22 −  (b1 2) 21 = 0. Joint-monotonicity rules
out that both partial derivatives 21 and
22 are negative, and (TA) rules out that they both equal
0. Therefore, the first-order condition implies that both are positive.
¤
Proposition 1. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. Suppose

1
³12
22
´
≥ 0. If 2 is (weakly) locally normal in 1 at ( (b1 2 (b1)) ;  (b1 2 (b1))), then
2 (1) is (weakly) increasing in 1 at b1. Hence if 2 is (weakly) normal in 1, then 2 (1) is
(weakly) increasing in 1 at all b1.
Consider a small increase in FM’s action b01  b1. Assume (for contradiction) that SM weakly
decreases his action, so that SM’s material payoﬀ rises while FM’s falls. Call  the allocation
−→ (b1 2 (b1)) and  the allocation −→ (b01 2 (b01)). In the (2 − 1)-plane,  is northwest of
. Now draw the lines with slopes − (b1 2 (b1)) and − (b01 2 (b01))  − (b1 2 (b1)) going
through  and  respectively; this inequality is implied by A3 and 1
³12
22
´
≤ 0. The lines
will intersect at some generic point, say . There are two cases:  is either strictly southeast of
both  and , or  is strictly southeast of  and northwest of . The argument is similar in
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both cases, so suppose the latter. The change from  to  can be decomposed into a substitution
eﬀect and an income eﬀect (where  is the “endowment” consumption bundle). The substitution
eﬀect causes a move from  to a point 0 weakly northwest of . Because of (weak) normality,
the income eﬀect then makes us move from 0 to , where  needs to be (weakly) northeast of
0–and therefore (weakly) north of .But  actually lies (strictly) south of , a contradiction.
¤
Lemma 2. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. Then:
1. There exists a unique b1 such that the resulting transaction (b1 2 (b1)) is MPE. This trans-
action is SM’s favorite transaction
¡1 2¢, and it is UPE.
2. An equilibrium exists. Moreover, if 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0, then an equilibrium exists in which the
players exchange rather than taking their outside options.
Proof of part 1: We will prove that given any action b1, the transaction (b1 2 (b1))
resulting from the unique best-response 2 (b1) is MPE if and only if (b1 2 (b1)) is SM’s fa-
vorite transaction. The “if” direction follows immediately from the fact that SM’s favorite trans-
action is MPE (Theorem 1), so we focus on the “only if” direction. Suppose (b1 2 (b1)) is
MPE but is not SM’s favorite transaction
¡1 2¢. Every point on the MPE frontier −→ (1 2)
touches exactly one budget curve,  (1); the transaction (1 2) satisfies the MPE condition
11
12 =
21
22 , which implies
12
¯¯¯
 =
11
21 =
12
22 =
12
¯¯¯
(1)
, and therefore the
budget curve is tangent to the MPE frontier at −→ (1 2). Hence SM’s indiﬀerence curve passing
through −→ (b1 2 (b1)) is tangent to the MPE frontier at −→ (b1 2 (b1)). So there is some −→ (01 02)
on the MPE frontier between −→ (b1 2 (b1)) and −→ ¡1 2¢, suﬃciently close to −→ (b1 2 (b1)), such
that 2(−→ (01 02))  2(−→ (b1 2 (b1))). But this contradicts the fact that 2 is strictly decreasing
as we move away from −→ ¡1 2¢ along the MPE frontier (as stated in Technical Lemma). Theorem
2 states that SM’s favorite transaction is UPE.
Proof of part 2: From part 1, if FM chooses action 1, SM will choose action 2. Joint-
monotonicity and A4-A5 imply that 2 ¡1 2¢  0. Since some action other than 1 may give
FM an even higher utility than 1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ ≥ 0, this is a lower bound on FM’s equilibrium
utility. From Technical Lemma, the set of individually-rational transactions  is compact. Since
1 (−→ (1 2 (1))) is continuous, there exists an optimal action 1 in  . The result follows.
¤
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Theorem 2. Suppose 1 and 2 are joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, and potentially fairness-
kinked. If the equilibrium (1 2 (1)) is MPE, then (1 2 (1)) is SM’s favorite transaction, and
1 (−→ (1 2 (1))) ≥ 0. Furthermore, at least one of the following must be true:
1. FM’s favorite transaction is the same as SM’s favorite transaction, i.e., (1 2) = ¡1 2¢.
2. (12(1))1 = 0.
3. 2 is fairness-kinked at −→ (1 2 (1)) 
Proof: It follows directly from Lemma 2 (part 1) that if the equilibrium (1 2 (1)) is
MPE, then (1 2 (1)) is SM’s favorite transaction. Clearly, if (1 2 (1)) is an equilibrium, then
1 (−→ (1 2 (1))) ≥ 0; otherwise, FM would prefer her outside option.
SM’s best-response function 2 (1) solves the problem of choosing SM’s most-preferred material
payoﬀ pair along the budget curve  (1):
(∗1 (1 2 (1))  ∗2 (1 2 (1))) = argmax−→ 2 (
−→ ) subject to −→ ∈  (1)  (1)
As described in the text and illustrated in Figure 3, the solution to this problem, −→ , is the same
as the solution to the standard consumer optimization where the budget line is the linear approxi-
mation to the budget curve at the solution −→ ∗ (1 2 (1)) to the problem (1):
(e1 ( )  e2 ( )) = argmax−→ 2 (−→ ) subject to 1 + 2 =  (2)
where  =  (1 2 (1)) = − 12
¯¯¯
(1)
and  = ∗1 (1 2 (1)) +  (1 2 (1))∗2 (1 2 (1)).
Since 2 is potentially fairness-kinked,  (1 2 (1)),  (1 2 (1)), e1 ( ), and e2 ( ) are all
continuously diﬀerentiable functions. Now, there are two possible cases, depending on whether the
change in FM’s action leads to a change in 
Case 1: (12(1))1 6= 0. The Slutsky equation can be applied to find the eﬀects on e1 and e2:

1 e1 ( ) = e1 ( e1 + e2) + e1 ( ) (1 − ∗1)

1 e2 ( ) = e2 ( e1 + e2)| {z }
substitution eﬀect
+
e2 ( )
 (2 − 
∗
2)| {z }
income eﬀect
where ∗1 and ∗2 are the solutions from (1), (1 2) is the material payoﬀ pair where the original
budget line intersects with the new budget line (as illustrated in Figure 4; in standard consumer
6
theory, this intersection point would be interpreted as the endowment consumption bundle), and
we omit writing the dependence of  and  on (1 2 (1)) to avoid cluttering notation.
To calculate the income eﬀect, we begin by finding (1 2). We suppress dependence on 2 (1)
by writing the equation for the budget line as 1 (1) =  (1) −  (1)2 (1). Since (1 2) is
the intersection of the old budget line and the new budget line, it satisfies 1 =  (1)−  (1)2
and 1 =  (1 +∆1) −  (1 +∆1)2. Solving these two equations simultaneously gives 2 =
(1+∆1)−(1)
(1+∆1)−(1) =
(1+∆1)−(1)∆1(1+∆1)−(1)∆1
, so for small ∆1,
2 =  (1) 1 (1) 1 and 1 =  (1)−  (1)2
We now calculate (1 − ∗1) and (2 − ∗2). Using the definition of , (1)1 = (1)1 ∗2 (1) +
 (1) ∗2(1)1 + 
∗
1(1)1 . Substituting and simplifying gives
(2 − ∗2) =
 (1 2 (1)) ∗2(12(1))1 + 
∗
1(12(1))1
(12(1))1
=
 (1 2 (1)) ∗2(12(1))1 + 
∗
1(12(1))1
(12(1))1
= 0
The second equality can be intepreted as an envelope condition:  (1 2 (1)) ∗2(12(1))2 +
∗1(12(1))2 = 0 because, at a fixed  =  (1 2 (1)), SM has maximized “income” by choosing the
material payoﬀ pair on the MPE frontier. The third equality uses  ≡ − 12
¯¯¯
(1)
= −1(12)22(12)2
and the MPE condition, 
∗
1(12)1∗2(12)1 =
∗1(12)2∗2(12)2 . Substituting 2 = ∗2 into the equation for
1 gives 1 =  (1) −  (1)∗2, but since this expression equals ∗1, (1 − ∗1) = 0. Therefore,
starting from an MPE transaction, the income eﬀect from a change in FM’s action equals zero.
To calculate the substitution eﬀect, we define e () = e2 + e1 and use the implicit function
theorem on the first-order condition for problem (2),
2(−22)
2 − 
2(−22)
1 = 0:
e2 ( e1 + e2)
 = −
2212
³()
 − e2´− 21 −  22(1)2 ³() − e2´
22
(2)2 − 2 
2212 + 2 
22
(1)2
= −
−
³21 ´3
22
(2)2
³21 ´2 − 221 22 2212 + ³22 ´2 22(1)2 = −
1
22
(1)2
¯¯¯
2(∗1∗2)

where the second equality follows from () = e2 and substituting SM’s first-order condition for
problem (2). A similar calculation yields 1( 1+2) =

22(1)2|2(∗1∗2)

7
An interior equilibrium transaction satisfies FM’s first-order condition, which can be written in
terms of the budget lines: 11 (e1 ( )  e2 ( )) = 0. (A6 combined with joint-monotonicity
of 2 ensures that SM’s favorite transaction is indeed interior.) Using the income and substitution
eﬀects derived above,

11 (e1 ( )  e2 ( )) = 11 1 e1 ( ) + 12 1 e2 ( )
=
µ1
2 − 
1
1
¶
· 1
− 22(1)2
¯¯¯
2(∗1∗2)

Recall that 11  0 and 12  0 (Lemma 1). Hence FM’s first-order condition is satisfied only if
(A) SM’s indiﬀerence curve is kinked at (∗1 ∗2), i.e., 22 (1)2
¯¯¯
2(∗1∗2)
= −∞; or (B) FM’s
favorite transaction is (∗1 ∗2), i.e., 1211 =  at (∗1 ∗2), which is also SM’s favorite transaction.
Case 2: (12(1))1 = 0. Since there is no substitution eﬀect, the new and old budget lines do
not intersect at an “endowment” (1 2). In this case, the Slutsky equation is:

1 e1 ( ) = e1 ( )  (1 2 (1))1

1 e2 ( ) = e2 ( )  (1 2 (1))1| {z }
income eﬀect

Diﬀerentiating  (1 2 (1)) =  (1 2 (1))2 (1 2 (1)) + 1 (1 2 (1)) gives
 (1 2 (1))
1 =
µ1
1 + 
2
1
¶
+
µ1
2 + 
2
2
¶ 2 (1)
1 +
 (1 2 (1))
1 2
=
1
1 + 
2
1 = 0
In the first line, the third term is zero by hypothesis, and the second term is zero using the
envelope theorem as above. The third equality follows from an analogous envelope observation:
for fixed  =  (1 2 (1)), FM’s action 1 maximizes income since (1 2 (1)) is MPE. Since the
income eﬀect is zero, FM’s first-order condition is clearly satisfied: 11 (e1 ( )  e2 ( )) =
11

1 e1 ( ) + 12 1 e2 ( ) = 0.
¤
Theorem 3. Suppose 1 is quasi-concave, and suppose 2 is joint-monotonic, quasi-concave,
and normal. Suppose the material payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transferable. If 1
is monotonic or purely self-regarding, and if 1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ ≥ 0 at SM’s favorite transaction¡1 2¢, then the unique equilibrium transaction is ¡1 2¢, which is MPE and UPE.
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Proof: Since the material payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transferable, the budget
curves are all parallel lines with slope − ≡ 12
¯¯¯
(1)
= 1(12)22(12)2 = − for some   0.
Because 2 is normal, SM’s best-response function 2 (1) ensures that 1 and 2 are both strictly
increasing in  (1). Since 1 is monotonic or purely self-regarding, FM maximizes her utility by
taking the action e1 that maximizes  (1). This is the action e1 = 1 that induces SM’s favorite
transaction because that is the unique action that induces an MPE transaction (by Lemma 2, part
1). Since 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0, this action gives FM at least as high utility as her outside option and is
therefore the unique equilibrium.
¤
Lemma 3. Suppose 2 is potentially fairness-kinked, with 2 and 2 being joint-monotonic,
quasi-concave, and continuously twice-diﬀerentiable. If 2 = min©2  2 ª satisfies
2 = 2
2
2 −  (b1 2 (b1)) 21  0
2
2 −  (b1 2 (b1)) 21  0
at −→ (b1 2 (b1)), then SM’s optimal strategy 2 (1) satisfies the fairness rule for all 1 in a
neighborhood of b1.
Proof: Since the given inequalities hold strictly at (b1 2 (b1)), there are some neighborhoods
 of b1 2 (b1), respectively, such that they hold for all (1 2) ∈ × . Once the neighborhood
 is chosen, we may take  to be small enough so that 2 (1) ∈  for all 1 ∈  (because 2 (1)
is a continuous function of 1 by Lemma 1). Thus, for any 1 in a neighborhood of b1, SM will
choose action 2 (1) such that  (−→ (1 2 (1))) =  (−→ (1 2 (1))).
¤
Theorem 4. Suppose 1 is quasi-concave, and suppose 2 is fairness-kinked, with 2 and 2
being joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, normal, and continuously twice-diﬀerentiable. Suppose 1
is either purely self-regarding, or strictly monotonic with FM’s favorite transaction (1 2) giving
higher material payoﬀ to FM than SM’s favorite transaction ¡1 2¢. Suppose the players’ material
payoﬀ function are (1 2)-additively-separable. Let (b1b2) denote the (necessarily unique) trans-
action with b1  1 such that 1(b1b2) = 1 ¡1 2¢ and 2(b1b2) = 0. If 1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ ≥ 0,
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and if, at −→ ¡1 2¢,
2 = 2
2
2 − (1b2)21  0
2
2 − 
¡1 2¢ 21  0
then the unique equilibrium transaction is
¡1 2¢, which is MPE and UPE.
Proof: We first show that (b1b2) exists and is the unique transaction satisfying 1(b1b2) =
1 ¡1 2¢, 2(b1b2) = 0, and b1  1. Given A2, A3, and A6, clearly there is a unique material
payoﬀ pair on SM’s 2 = 0 indiﬀerence curve such that 1 = 1 ¡1 2¢, so (b1b2) exists. Call that
material payoﬀ pair ¡1 b2¢. Define e2 (1) ≡ ©1 : 1(1e2 (1)) = 1ª, which is a continuous,
strictly increasing function (by A2), and a strictly convex function (by the concavity assumption on
FM’s material payoﬀ function). Define ee2 (1 2) ≡ n1 : 2(1ee2) = 2o, which is a continuous
function, strictly increasing in both arguments, and strictly concave in 1. From the proof of
Theorem 1, we know there is a unique 1 such that e2 (1) = ee2 ¡1 2¢, which is 1. Together
with the fact that b2  2, these observations imply that there is a unique 1 such that e2 (1) =ee2 (1 b2) and 1  1. We also note that (b1b2)¿ ¡1 2¢.
We next show that 1 is a local optimum for FM. By hypothesis,
2
2 − (1b2)21  0
at −→ ¡1 2¢. This ensures 22 ≥ 0 at −→ ¡1 2¢ (otherwise we would have to have 21  0, vio-
lating joint-monotonicity). Since 2 ≥ b2 and − 2  0 (Technical Lemma), we have − ¡1 2¢ 
−(1b2) and so
2
2 − 
¡1 2¢ 21  0
at −→ ¡1 2¢ also. Hence Lemma 3 implies that SM’s optimal strategy 2 (1) satisfies the fairness
rule for all 1 in a neighborhood of 1. It follows that 1 is a local optimum for FM, regardless of
whether her social preferences are purely self-regarding or monotonic. To show that 1 is a global
optimum for FM, we first prove a preparatory claim.
Preparatory claim: We claim that
2
2 − (1b2)21  0
at all individually-rational transactions (1 2) such that 1(1 2)  1 ¡1 2¢. Suppose to
the contrary there were some −→ (1 2) at which 22 − (1b2)21 ≤ 0; we will show that
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21 ≥ 0. There are two cases. When 

22 − (1b2)21 = 0, 1 and 2 have the same
sign since (1b2)  0, and so 21 ≥ 0 there (else joint-monotonicity is violated). And when
22 − (1b2)21  0, we must again have 21 ≥ 0 (else 22  0, violating joint-monotonicity).
So by choosing a value  slightly larger than (1b2), we must have
2
2 − 
2
1  0
at −→ (1 2). Since  is very close to (1b2), we also know that
2
2 − 
2
1  0
at −→ ¡1 2¢.
If we draw budget lines  0 each with slope − passing through the two points −→ ¡1 2¢ and
−→ (1 2), respectively, SM’s most-preferred point on  is below −→ ¡1 2¢ and his most-preferred
point on 0 is above −→ (1 2). By assumption, 1(1 2)  1 ¡1 2¢. Since −→ ¡1 2¢ lies on the
MPE frontier, which is downward sloping and concave,  is to the right of 0. So the normal good
assumption is violated; a contradiction.
We now prove that 1 is the global optimum for FM in two cases, but before proceeding, we
make three notes.
First, at any individual transaction such that 1(1 2) = 1(b1b2) and 2(1 2)  2(b1b2)
we must have (1 2)À (b1b2). Suppose not. By A2, we have (1 2)¿ (b1b2). Assuming for
now that −1(12)11(12)2  2(12)1−2(12)2 , then by A2 and strict quasi-concavity of 2, 2(1 2) ≤
2(b1b2); a contradiction. We now show that −1(12)11(12)2  2(12)1−2(12)2 . Because ¡1 2¢
is MPE,
−1(12)1
1(12)2 =
2(12)1
−2(12)2 . Since (b1b2) ¿ ¡1 2¢, 1(1 2) = 1(b1b2), and
2(1 2)  2(b1b2), the strict quasi-concavity of 1 and 2 combined with A2 imply that
−1(12)1
1(12)2 
−1(12)1
1(12)2 and
2(12)1
−2(12)2 
2(12)1
−2(12)2 .
Second, because the material payoﬀ functions are additively separable, the slope of any budget
curve, (1 2), does not depend on 1, and so we will write it as  (2).
Third, since 2
¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ = 2 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢, and since SM’s fairness rule is strictly increas-
ing, the relevant part of SM’s utility function for any (1 2) with 1 ≥ 1 ¡1 2¢ is 2 .
Case 1: FM is purely self-regarding. To show that 1 is the unique global optimum
for FM, it is suﬃcient to show that there does not exist any individually-rational transaction
(1 2 (1)) 6= ¡1 2¢ that satisfies 1(1 2 (1)) ≥ 1 ¡1 2¢. Suppose to the contrary that
there exists an individually-rational transaction (01 2 (01)) 6=
¡1 2¢ such that 1(01 2 (01)) ≥
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1 ¡1 2¢. Then 22 − (2 (01))21 = 0 at −→ (01 2 (01)). If 1(01 2 (01)) = 1 ¡1 2¢,
then since (01 2 (01)) À (b1b2) and 2  0, we have (2 (01))   (b2). So if 21  0 then
22 − (2 (01))

21  

22 − (b2)21 ≥ 0 at (01 2 (01)) (using Preparatory Claim); and if
21 = 0, then
22 − (2 (01))

21  0 at (01 2 (01)) by TA1; a contradiction.
So we must have 1(01 2 (01))  1
¡1 2¢. By A2, there is a unique transaction 02 that
satisfies 1(01 02) = 1
¡1 2¢, where 02  2 (01). If we draw budget lines 0 with slopes
−(02) and −(2 (01)) passing through the two points −→ (01 02) and −→ (01 2 (01)), SM’s most-
preferred point on line  is below −→ (01 02) (since −

2 (12)2
2 (12)1  −
¡1 2¢ i.e., at −→ ¡1 2¢
SM’s indiﬀerence curve is steeper than the budget curve  ¡1¢ and using Technical Lemma) and
his most-preferred point on0 is (by definition) −→ (01 2 (01)). Now if we draw a third line00 with
slope −(2 (01))  −(02) going through −→ (01 2 (01)) (moving from 0 to 00 can be thought of
as a Slutsky compensated price change), then SM’s most-preferred point on line 00 must be above
−→ (01 2 (01)). But this is a violation of the normal good assumption; a contradiction.
Case 2: FM’s distributional preferences are strictly monotonic and 1 (1 2) 
1 ¡1 2¢. We claim that there is no 01 6= 1 such that 1(01 2 (01)) ≥ 1 ¡1 2¢. We showed
in Case 1 that there is no 01 6= 1 such that 1(01 2 (01)) ≥ 1
¡1 2¢. The result then follows
from the observation that, since 1 is monotonic and 1 (1 2)  1 ¡1 2¢, the region enclosed
by the upper-contour set of FM’s 1 = 1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ indiﬀerence curve and MPE frontier contains
only material payoﬀ pairs satisfying 1(1 2)  1 ¡1 2¢. This completes the proof.
¤
Theorem 5 (Rotten Kid Theorem). Suppose 1 is quasi-concave, and either purely self-
regarding or monotonic. Suppose 2 is monotonic, quasi-concave, and normal. In the rotten kid
game (Example 2), the unique equilibrium transaction is SM’s favorite transaction
¡1 2¢, which
maximizes family income.
Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 3. There is no assumption that 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0 because
neither player has an outside option.
¤
Theorem 6. Suppose 1 and 2 are joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, and potentially fairness-
kinked. If the equilibrium (∗1 2 (∗1)) is UPE, then at least one of the following must be true:
1. (∗1 2 (∗1)) is also MPE.
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2. 2 is fairness-kinked at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)), and SM’s indiﬀerence curve for disadvantageously
unfair transactions is tangent to SM’s fairness rule at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)).
3. 1 and 2 are fairness-kinked at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)), and the fairness rules 1 and 2 have dif-
ferent slopes at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)).
Proof: First we show that if 2 is continuously diﬀerentiable at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)), then any
UPE equilibrium is also MPE. From the proof of Theorem 1, we know that a material payoﬀ pair
can be UPE but not MPE only if it is strictly within the materially-feasible set and occurs at
a tangency between FM’s and SM’s interpersonal indiﬀerence curves. Further, the tangency line
through −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)) must be weakly positively sloped. However, according to Lemma 1, if 2
is continuously diﬀerentiable at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)), then SM’s indiﬀerence curve is strictly negatively-
sloped there. This proves the claim.
Next we show that if a UPE equilibrium occurs at a non-MPE transaction (∗1 2 (∗1)), 2
is fairness-kinked at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)), and 1 is continuously diﬀerentiable at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)), then
SM’s indiﬀerence curve for disadvantagously unfair transactions is tangent to SM’s fairness rule
at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)). As above, we know that −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)) must lie strictly within the materially-
feasible set and occur at a weakly upward-sloping tangency between FM’s and SM’s interper-
sonal indiﬀerence curves. Since 2 is fairness-kinked at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)), the curve traced out by
{−→ (1 2 (1))}1∈R must be tangent to SM’s fairness rule at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)). Since −→ (∗1 2 (∗1))
is an equilibrium and 1 is continuously diﬀerentiable at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)), FM’s indiﬀerence curve
is tangent to the curve traced out by {−→ (1 2 (1))}1∈R at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)) and hence also tan-
gent to SM’s fairness rule at that point. Since 2 is fairness-kinked at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)), SM’s in-
diﬀerence curve in the region of disadvantageously unfair transactions must be weakly steeper
at −→ (∗1 2 (∗1)) than SM’s fairness rule. But if it were strictly steeper, then −→ (∗1 2 (∗1))
would be utility-Pareto dominated by an arbitrarily close material payoﬀ pair that is also on SM’s
disadvantageously-unfair indiﬀerence curve. We conclude that SM’s indiﬀerence curve must be
tangent.
Finally, note that if a UPE equilibrium occurs at a non-MPE transaction (1 2 (1)), and if
1 and 2 are each fairness-kinked at (1 (1 2 (1))  2 (1 2 (1))), then the players must be
following diﬀerent fairness rules at −→ (1 2 (1)). If they were following the same fairness rule
locally, then FM could get higher utility by deviating to an action that induces SM to implement
a material payoﬀ pair further northeast along the shared fairness rule.
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